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I. INTRODUCTION 
In 2001, Revised Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC)1 
became effective in most United States jurisdictions.2  With Revised 
Article 9, the drafters hoped to increase the certainty, objectivity, and 
uniformity that was often lacking in secured transactions under former 
Article 9.3  However, the nonexistence of a clear standard in section 9-
503(a), as to the sufficiency of a debtor name, highlights the continued 
inability of Revised Article 9 to provide enough commercial certainty for 
parties engaging in secured transactions.4 
At first glance, the requirement that a financing statement provide 
the name of the debtor appears simple enough.5  However, section 9-
503(a) provides a somewhat circular test for determining the sufficiency 
of an individual debtor name6 and an imprecise mandate for determining 
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 1. Unless otherwise indicated, all citations in this Article are to the 2009 version of the UCC 
found in SELECTED COMMERCIAL STATUTES (Carol L. Chomsky et al. eds., West 2009). 
 2. Margit Livingston, Livingston on Trade Names on Article 9 Financing Statements, 
EMERGING ISSUES ANALYSIS, Sept. 14, 2009, available at LexisNexis, 2009 Emerging Issues 4260. 
 3. See U.C.C. § 9-101 cmt. 4(h) (2009) (stating that Part 5 of Revised Article 9 was 
“substantially rewritten to simplify the statutory text and to deal with numerous problems of 
interpretation and implementation that [arose] over the years”). 
 4. See id. § 9-503(a)(1), (4)(A). 
 5. See Harry C. Sigman, Twenty Questions About Filing Under Revised Article 9: The Rules of 
the Game Under New Part 5, 74 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 861, 861 (1999) (a member of the Drafting 
Committee to revise Article 9 setting forth the opinion that in most transactions “filing should be as 
simple as child’s play” under Article 9’s revised filing provisions). 
 6. See U.C.C. § 9-503(a)(4)(A); see also Paul Hodnefield, New Texas UCC Legislation 
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the sufficiency of a registered-organization debtor name.7  In the case of 
an individual, the financing statement must provide the individual name 
of the debtor.8  Because no additional guidance is given,9 filers may be 
required to evaluate documents and records listing inaccurate debtor 
names or different variations of a particular debtor’s name.10  In addition, 
filers must consider issues such as assumed names, nicknames, and name 
changes.11  If the effectiveness of the financing statement is ever 
challenged, the practical result for the filer is uncertainty regarding 
whether a court will deem the individual name provided sufficient for the 
purpose of giving notice to subsequent creditors of the filer’s security 
interest.  In the case of a registered organization, the financing statement 
must list the name indicated “on the public record of the debtor’s 
jurisdiction of organization which shows the debtor to have been 
organized.”12  Because the appropriate public record is not specified,13 
the name of a registered organization as set forth on any number of 
different public records could arguably comply with this standard.14  As 
such, Revised Article 9 again introduces ambiguity and individual 
judgment where definitive guidance would best serve a UCC filer.  
                                                                                                                       
Changes Debtor Name Requirements, CORP. SERVICE COMPANY, 1–2 (July 2007), https://www.csc 
global.com/cscglobal/pdfs/TX-Legislation-Changes-UCC-Debtor-Name-Requirements.pdf (“This 
rather circular requirement [of section 9-503(a)(4)(A)] provides no indication of what constitutes the 
correct name of an individual.”). 
 7. See U.C.C. § 9-503(a)(1); see also Hodnefield, supra note 6, at 3 (“Revised Article 9 also 
contains some ambiguity concerning the source of registered organization names.”). 
 8. U.C.C. § 9-503(a)(4)(A). 
 9. See, e.g., Pankratz Implement Co. v. Citizens Nat’l Bank, 130 P.3d 57, 65 (Kan. 2006) 
(acknowledging that section 9-503, as adopted in Kansas, “provides no specific rule or guidance 
concerning what constitutes a sufficient debtor ‘name,’” and further noting that the terms “name,” 
“name of debtor,” “debtor’s name,” and “correct name” are not defined in Article 9). 
 10. See, e.g., Genoa Nat’l Bank v. Sw. Implement, Inc. (In re Borden), 353 B.R. 886, 887–88 
(Bankr. D. Neb. 2006) (noting that the debtor’s legal name was “Michael Borden” and was stated as 
such on many legal documents, including the debtor’s birth certificate, driver’s license, real estate 
deeds, bank accounts, tax returns, and bankruptcy petition, but the shortened name “Mike Borden” 
was often signed on legal documents such as tax returns, security documents, and financial 
statements); In re Gustafson, 14 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 231, 232–33 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 
1973) (where the debtor’s legal name was “Arthur J. Gustafson,” but the debtor routinely used the 
incorrectly spelled name “Arthur J. Gustavsen,” including in connection with secured-loan 
transactions, title to real estate, telephone listings, and employment). 
 11. See 9B WILLIAM D. HAWKLAND ET AL., UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE SERIES § 9-503:5 
(2001) (discussing the practical problems that may hinder a filer’s ability to determine a particular 
debtor’s name); see also Margit Livingston, A Rose by Any Other Name Would Smell as Sweet (or 
Would It?): Filing and Searching in Article 9’s Public Records, 2007 BYU L. REV. 111, 154–55 
(2007) (discussing same); John K. Pearson & J. Scott Pohl, If the Name Is Bubba, You’d Better Spell 
It Right, AM. BANKR. INST. J., June 2006, at 24, 71, 72 (discussing same). 
 12. U.C.C. § 9-503(a)(1). 
 13. See id. §§ 1-201, 9-102, 9-503(a)(1) (none of which define the term “public record”). 
 14. See Hodnefield, supra note 6, at 3. 
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Filers, therefore, face a great deal of uncertainty regarding the 
effectiveness of a filed financing statement used to perfect a security 
interest in debtor property. 
The lack of a clear-cut test for determining sufficient debtor names 
not only affects UCC filers, but also aggravates UCC searchers.  
Subsequent creditors conducting due diligence before entering into a 
secured transaction with a particular debtor will generally attempt to 
identify any preexisting security interests to avoid taking a security 
interest in property that is already encumbered.  As such, a subsequent 
creditor must search the filing-office records to disclose any prior liens 
affecting a proposed debtor’s property.15  Although the filing office 
indexes financing statements by the debtor name,16 the lack of a clear-cut 
debtor-name standard means that searchers cannot rely on filers to use a 
standardized formation of a debtor name when filing a financing 
statement.  Therefore, UCC searchers must consider all possible variants 
of a debtor name that any prior filers may have judged to be compliant 
with section 9-503(a), including the likelihood of multiple financing 
statements filed by a single filer using variants of a debtor name to 
reduce the risk of unintentionally providing an insufficient debtor name 
for perfection.17  Differing search logic between filing offices in different 
jurisdictions compounds the uncertainty because broader search logic 
may return results that narrower search logic would fail to disclose.18  
Consequently, searchers have not been able to reap the intended benefits 
of Revised Article 9, which sought to eliminate the need for searchers to 
guess all potential variations of a debtor name in favor of an approach 
where searchers could reliably conduct a single search using the debtor’s 
                                                     
 15. See, e.g., Corona Fruits & Veggies, Inc. v. Frozsun Foods, Inc., 48 Cal. Rptr. 3d 868, 869 
(Ct. App. 2006) (noting that the debtor’s name is particularly important because financing statements 
are indexed under the name of the debtor and those who wish to find them search under the debtor’s 
name). 
 16. U.C.C. § 9-519(c); see also id. § 9-503 cmt. 2 (noting that “[f]inancing statements are 
indexed under the name of the debtor”). 
 17. See Ingrid Michelsen Hillinger, Ingrid Michelsen Hillinger on Peoples Bank v. Bryan 
Brothers Cattle Co., EMERGING ISSUES ANALYSIS, Dec. 16, 2007, available at LexisNexis, 2008 
Emerging Issues 1542 (noting that filers can protect themselves by filing multiple financing 
statements under every possible name because wrong names on a financing statement do not count 
against the filer if one of them is correct and recommending that filers list all possible correct 
names). 
 18. See Livingston, supra note 11, at 146 (noting that the uniformity of Revised Article 9 is lost 
because of varying filing-office search logic); Ingrid Michelsen Hillinger, Ingrid Michelsen 
Hillinger on Filed Financing Statement Search Systems, EMERGING ISSUES ANALYSIS, Dec. 1, 2008, 
available at LexisNexis, 2008 Emerging Issues 3216 (noting that “state filing offices do not have 
uniform search logics, uniform searches or uniform search results” and that “courts in different states 
will develop different standards for evaluating the sufficiency of a filed financing statement”). 
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correct name.19  Thus, like UCC filers, subsequent creditors searching for 
recorded financing statements also face a great deal of commercial 
uncertainty because the lack of a clear debtor-name standard functions as 
a roadblock to the ability of searchers to locate preexisting security 
interests.  As such, the uncertainty over a sufficient debtor name for 
purposes of filing a financing statement creates a critical breakdown in 
the notice-filing system for both UCC filers and UCC searchers. 
Years after the adoption of Revised Article 9, frustration with the 
ambiguity in the sufficiency-of-a-debtor-name standard in section 9-
503(a) and the resulting commercial uncertainty in secured transactions 
has finally led to state-specific attempts to fix the problem.  In 2007, 
Texas became the first state to enact a nonuniform amendment 
specifically aimed at eliminating any continuing ambiguity in the 
sufficiency-of-a-debtor-name standard.20  Other jurisdictions have 
followed Texas’s lead, with states such as Tennessee, Nebraska, and 
Virginia adopting nonuniform amendments as well.21  The rise of state-
specific nonuniform amendments supports the idea that even more states 
will soon follow with their own legislative attempts to address the 
problems surrounding the sufficiency of a debtor name under Revised 
Article 9. 
This Article eschews the long-standing debate over the meaning of 
section 9-503(a) and the best practices for complying with the 
requirement to provide a sufficient debtor name.  Instead, this Article 
argues that, as a practical matter, a uniform amendment to Revised 
Article 9 is both long overdue and necessary to prevent the proliferation 
of state-specific amendments from destroying uniformity in secured 
transactions across United States jurisdictions.  Accordingly, Part II 
discusses the important role of the debtor name in secured transactions 
and the difficulties faced by UCC filers, UCC searchers, and courts when 
attempting to decipher the ambiguous sufficiency-of-a-debtor-name 
requirements under Revised Article 9.  Part III goes on to critically 
analyze the nonuniform amendments enacted in various jurisdictions, 
which attempt to improve certainty for debtor-name issues.  Finally, Part 
IV discusses the need for a uniform amendment and, to facilitate 
discussion about and development of a model uniform amendment for 
                                                     
 19. See Livingston, supra note 11, at 125; see also Genoa Nat’l Bank v. Sw. Implement, Inc. (In 
re Borden), 353 B.R. 886, 888–89 (Bankr. D. Neb. 2006) (giving an example of the multiple 
searches required under former Article 9 and discussing the intended difference under Revised 
Article 9). 
 20. See S.B. 1540, Legis. Sess. 80(R) (Tex. 2007). 
 21. See infra Part III.B–C. 
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nationwide adoption, proposes a reasoned framework for addressing the 
existing sufficiency-of-a-debtor-name problems in Revised Article 9. 
II. DEBTOR NAMES UNDER REVISED ARTICLE 9 
A. The Important Role of Debtor Names 
For creditors wishing to take and perfect a security interest in a 
debtor’s personal property, filing a proper financing statement with the 
filing office of the appropriate jurisdiction is an essential part of the 
process, and no single piece of information in a financing statement may 
be more important than the debtor name.  As a general rule, a financing 
statement must be filed22 to perfect all security interests under Revised 
Article 9.23  Other than certain specified exceptions,24 filing a financing 
statement remains the most common method of perfecting most security 
interests.25  The importance of perfection to a secured creditor, however, 
is unequivocal.  Without proper perfection of a security interest, a 
secured creditor may lose priority over competing claimants to a debtor’s 
property and may see the value of its security interest disappear.26  The 
formal requirements for a financing statement are set out in section 9-
502.27  A financing statement must provide (1) the name of the debtor, 
(2) the name of the secured party (or a representative of the secured 
                                                     
 22. In general, the UCC requires filing of a financing statement with the filing office in the 
jurisdiction where the debtor is located.  See U.C.C. §§ 9-301(1), -501(a) (2009). 
 23. Id. § 9-310(a); see also Corona Fruits & Veggies, Inc. v. Frozsun Foods, Inc., 48 Cal. Rptr. 
3d 868, 869 (Ct. App. 2006) (noting that a financing statement is generally required to perfect a 
security interest); HAWKLAND ET AL., supra note 11, § 9-310:1 (noting that a financing statement is 
generally required “to perfect all security interests”). 
 24. See U.C.C. § 9-310(b) (listing exceptions where filing a financing statement is 
unnecessary); id. § 9-312(b)–(g) (allowing perfection of security interests in chattel paper, deposit 
accounts, documents, goods covered by documents, instruments, investment property, letter-of-credit 
rights, and money by alternative means such as perfection by control and temporary perfection 
without filing). 
 25. See id. § 9-310(a); see also HAWKLAND ET AL., supra note 11, § 9-310:1 (noting that “filing 
remains the normal way to perfect most security interests”); Livingston, supra note 2 (discussing the 
fact that “creditors who wish to take and perfect a security interest in their debtors’ personal property 
or fixtures under Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code must be mindful of the need to file a 
proper financing statement in the appropriate public record”). 
 26. See U.C.C. § 9-322(a)(1) (showing the importance of filing first); id. § 9-322(a)(2) (noting 
that when one competing security interest is perfected and the other is not, the perfected security 
interest will have priority); id. § 9-322 cmt. 3 (discussing the general priority rules); see also 
Livingston, supra note 2 (noting that “[w]ithout proper perfection of their security interests, secured 
creditors will often lose priority over competing claimants to the debtor’s property and will see their 
security interests stripped away by the trustee in the event of a debtor’s bankruptcy”). 
 27. U.C.C. § 9-101 cmt. 4(h); see id. § 9-502. 
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party), and (3) an indication of the collateral that the financing statement 
covers.28  The debtor name, however, may be the single most critical 
piece of information on a financing statement and is an equally essential 
part of the UCC filing and search process.29  The essential role of the 
debtor name developed largely because filing offices must index 
financing statements according to the name of the debtor.30  Moreover, 
across all jurisdictions, those who wish to find recorded financing 
statements must conduct searches using the debtor name.31  As a result, a 
UCC search can only “reliably disclose relevant security interests” if the 
financing statement, and therefore the filing-office index, accurately 
reflects the debtor name.32  To give effective notice of a security interest, 
filers must therefore provide the debtor’s correct name.  Accordingly, the 
debtor name plays an essential role in the UCC filing and search process. 
Because of the central role of debtor names in the UCC filing and 
search system, filers of initial financing statements and searchers seeking 
to discover existing security interests must be mindful of the significance 
of appropriately identifying a debtor name.  For a secured party, 
correctly determining the debtor name and spelling it accurately on the 
filed financing statement can mean the difference between having 
                                                     
 28. Id. § 9-502(a)(1)–(3). 
 29. Id. § 9-503 cmt. 2 (noting that “[t]he requirement that a financing statement provide the 
debtor’s name is particularly important”); see also Clark v. Deere & Co. (In re Kinderknecht), 308 
B.R. 71, 74 (B.A.P. 10th Cir. 2004) (noting that the requirement that a financing statement provide 
the debtor’s name is particularly important); Corona Fruits & Veggies, Inc. v. Frozsun Foods, Inc., 
48 Cal. Rptr. 3d 868, 869 (Ct. App. 2006) (noting that the debtor’s name is particularly important 
because financing statements are indexed under the name of the debtor and those who wish to find 
them search under the debtor’s name); HAWKLAND ET AL., supra note 11, § 9-503:1 (noting that it is 
of critical importance to determine the debtor name and spell it correctly); Hillinger, supra note 17 
(noting a court’s acknowledgement of the importance of the debtor’s name to the Article 9 filing 
system); Livingston, supra note 2 (noting that the change in Revised Article 9 making a financing 
statement presumptively misleading if it fails to identify the proper debtor name highlights the 
notion that the debtor’s name is the “essence of the financing statement”). 
 30. U.C.C. §§ 9-503 cmt. 2, -519(c); see also Corona Fruits & Veggies, 48 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 869 
(noting that “[f]inancing statements are indexed under the name of the debtor”); HAWKLAND ET AL., 
supra note 11, § 9-503:1 (noting that “the index system for Article 9 filings is based on the debtor’s 
name”); Sigman, supra note 5, at 863–64 (noting that the debtor name is the key to discoverability of 
a filing and that section 9-506(b)–(c) of Revised Article 9 reflects the crucial nature of the debtor’s 
name and the “focus on discoverability in setting the boundaries for permissible error”); Livingston, 
supra note 2 (noting that because state filing-office indexes are based on debtor names and those 
searching for recorded financing statements search under the debtor name, “the debtor’s name is the 
gateway to the filing system and the single most significant bit of information on [a] financing 
statement”). 
 31. See Livingston, supra note 2; see also Corona Fruits & Veggies, 48 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 869 
(noting that “the debtor’s true last name is crucial because the financing statements are indexed by 
recorded last names”). 
 32. Hodnefield, supra note 6, at 1. 
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recourse against a debtor or walking away empty handed.33  Errors and 
omissions in the debtor name may result in an unperfected security 
interest and the loss of priority to a subsequent secured party that 
properly files a financing statement.34  Thus, every secured party has 
ample incentive to comply with section 9-503(a) and file a financing 
statement that appropriately identifies the debtor name.  For searchers, 
the debtor name is equally important because it is the mechanism by 
which an interested party can search filing-office records to discover 
whether another creditor already holds a security interest in certain 
collateral of a particular debtor.35  That is to say, any person searching 
for a preexisting security interest will search under the name of a 
prospective debtor to determine whether another filer has already 
encumbered any of the prospective debtor’s property through the filing 
of a financing statement.36  Thus, a filer’s error in providing the debtor 
name may result in the failure of the financing statement to notify 
subsequent creditors of a prior security interest.37  Identifying the debtor 
                                                     
 33. See Livingston, supra note 2 (noting that “[w]ithout proper perfection of their security 
interests, secured creditors will often lose priority over competing claimants to the debtor’s property 
and will see their security interests stripped away by the trustee in the event of the debtor’s 
bankruptcy”). 
 34. See Genoa Nat’l Bank v. Sw. Implement, Inc. (In re Borden), 353 B.R. 886, 892 (Bankr. D. 
Neb. 2006) (deeming an error in a filed financing statement fatal, and rendering the financing 
statement ineffective, when it provided the name “Mike Borden” instead of “Michael Borden”); see 
also HAWKLAND ET AL., supra note 11, § 9-503:1 (noting that “failure to provide the name of [a] 
debtor in accordance with the rules of revised Section 9-503 will lead to the conclusion that the 
financing statement is insufficient”); Hodnefield, supra note 6, at 1 (noting that failure to “provide 
the correct name of the debtor on the financing statement . . . could result in an unperfected security 
interest”); Livingston, supra note 2 (noting that “[w]ithout proper perfection of their security 
interests, secured creditors will often lose priority over competing claimants to the debtor’s property 
and will see their security interests stripped away by the trustee in the event of the debtor’s 
bankruptcy”). 
 35. See U.C.C. § 9-503 cmt. 2 (noting that “those who wish to find financing statements search 
for them under the debtor’s name”); id. § 9-506 cmt. 2 (noting that a financing statement with a 
minor error or omission is not seriously misleading and provides adequate notice of the existing 
security interest if a search of the debtor’s correct name would nonetheless find the erroneous 
financing statement); see also Clark v. Deere & Co. (In re Kinderknecht), 308 B.R. 71, 74 (B.A.P. 
10th Cir. 2004) (noting that “notice of a secured interest in property is accomplished by searching 
the debtor’s name”). 
 36. See U.C.C. § 9-503 cmt. 2. 
 37. See, e.g., Sw. Implement, 353 B.R. at 889 (discussing a situation where a search by a 
subsequent creditor did not disclose a prior financing statement filed under a nickname instead of the 
debtor’s full name); Receivables Purchasing Co. v. R & R Directional Drilling, LLC, 588 S.E.2d 
831, 832–33 (Ga. Ct. App. 2003) (holding that the first filer lost its perfected security interest in 
certain collateral due to an error in filing a financing statement under the name “Net work Solutions, 
Inc.” instead of “Network Solutions, Inc.”); Pankratz Implement Co. v. Citizens Nat’l Bank, 130 
P.3d 57, 59–62 (Kan. 2006) (finding the initial filer’s financing statement was rendered ineffective 
because it incorrectly listed the debtor name as “Roger House,” without a “d,” instead of “Rodger 
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name is, therefore, integral to ensuring commercial certainty and the 
continuing efficacy of the UCC filing and search process for both 
creditors filing an initial financing statement and subsequent parties 
searching for existing security interests. 
B. Sufficiency of a Debtor Name 
Given the vital role of the debtor name in the UCC filing and search 
process, Revised Article 9 curiously opts to provide little guidance to 
financing-statement filers and searchers for determining the debtor name.  
The lack of definitive guidance is particularly odd in light of the intent of 
Revised Article 9 to resolve problems of interpretation and to clarify the 
sufficiency-of-a-debtor-name standard by moving away from fact-
intensive tests in favor of a more bright-line rule.38  At first glance, the 
command of Revised Article 9 appears all too clear.  A financing 
statement must “provide[] the name of the debtor.”39  The clarity 
regarding debtor names, however, ends there.  Instead of unambiguously 
defining the term “debtor name,”40 Revised Article 9 only provides 
guidance in the form of sections 9-503 and 9-506, which address the 
sufficiency of a debtor name on a financing statement.41  Sections 9-503 
and 9-506 are intended to clarify when a debtor name is correct and 
when an incorrect name is insufficient.42  Specifically, section 9-503 
attempts to provide specific rules for determining when a financing 
statement sufficiently provides the name of a debtor.43  Section 9-506 
allows a financing statement substantially satisfying the requirements of 
                                                                                                                       
House,” and a search of the debtor’s correct name did not disclose the financing statement). 
 38. See Clark, 308 B.R. at 75 (noting that section 9-503 of Revised Article 9 “was enacted to 
clarify the sufficiency of a debtor’s name,” that the “intent to clarify when a debtor’s name is 
sufficient shows a desire to foreclose fact-intensive tests,” and that a “clear cut test [requiring 
provision of the debtor’s legal name] is in accord with that intent”); Pankratz, 130 P.3d at 67 (noting 
the intent of Revised Article 9 to move toward a bright-line rule to lessen the need for “judicial 
hairsplitting”); U.C.C. § 9-101 cmt. 4(h) (noting that Part 5 of Revised Article 9 was “substantially 
rewritten to simplify the statutory text and to deal with numerous problems of interpretation and 
implementation that [arose] over the years”). 
 39. U.C.C. § 9-502(a)(1). 
 40. Revised Article 9 does not define or otherwise provide guidance regarding what constitutes 
a debtor name.  See id. § 9-102 (which does not define “debtor name”); see also Clark, 308 B.R. at 
75 (noting that the UCC, as adopted by Kansas, does not provide any detail regarding the name of an 
individual debtor, but “simply states that the ‛name of the debtor’ should be used”). 
 41. See U.C.C. §§ 9-503, -506; see also id. § 9-101 cmt. 4(h) (noting that “[s]ections 9-503 and 
9-506 address the sufficiency of a name provided on a financing statement”). 
 42. Id. § 9-101 cmt. 4(h). 
 43. See id. § 9-503; see also HAWKLAND ET AL., supra note 11, § 9-503:1 (discussing the 
purpose of section 9-503). 
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Revised Article 9 to be effective despite minor errors, including errors in 
the debtor name, so long as the errors do not make the financing 
statement seriously misleading.44  Unfortunately, section 9-503 only 
manages to set forth a confusing standard for certain debtor names—
registered-organization debtors—while remaining completely silent for 
others—individual debtors.45  Because of the uncertainty surrounding 
debtor names for purposes of filing an initial financing statement, the 
safe harbor of section 9-506(c) often stands as the only mechanism to 
prevent a flawed debtor name from rendering a financing statement 
ineffective.46  Unfortunately, section 9-506(c) offers little in the way of 
additional certainty because it sets forth a stringent test to determine the 
applicability of the safe harbor47 and fails to sufficiently define key 
components of that test.48  Thus, while the debtor name is the key to the 
UCC filing and search process, Revised Article 9 fails to give filers and 
searchers sufficient direction regarding this integral piece of information, 
which makes the task of determining the correct debtor name much more 
difficult than it would otherwise appear.49 
1. Individual Debtor Names 
Section 9-503 sets forth the Revised Article 9 standard for 
determining whether a financing statement sufficiently provides the 
name of a debtor.50  For an individual debtor, as opposed to a corporation 
or other organization, section 9-503(a)(4)(A) simply states that a 
financing statement sufficiently identifies the debtor name if “it provides 
the individual . . . name of the debtor.”51  Neither Revised Article 9, nor 
the UCC provisions of general applicability, define what constitutes the 
                                                     
 44. U.C.C. § 9-506(a); accord HAWKLAND ET AL., supra note 11, § 9-506:1. 
 45. See U.C.C. § 9-503(a)(1), (4)(A); see also Hodnefield, supra note 6, at 3 (noting that 
Revised Article 9 creates ambiguity regarding both individual names and registered-organization 
names). 
 46. See U.C.C. § 9-506. 
 47. See HAWKLAND ET AL., supra note 11, § 9-503:1 (noting that section 9-506 contains very 
specific rules with respect to errors in debtor names and is not particularly forgiving with respect to 
most errors in a debtor name). 
 48. See infra Part II.B.3. 
 49. See John Krahmer, Commercial Transactions, 61 SMU L. REV. 657, 677 (2008) (noting that 
the problems facing secured parties in correctly naming a debtor stem from difficulty in determining 
the debtor’s name); see also Hodnefield, supra note 6, at 1 (noting that there is “no standard for 
determining the name of an individual”); Livingston, supra note 2 (noting that getting the debtor’s 
name right on a financing statement is more difficult than it would first appear). 
 50. See U.C.C. § 9-503. 
 51. Id. § 9-503(a)(4)(A). 
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individual name of a particular debtor or offer any further detail on how 
to determine a sufficient individual debtor name.52  Academics, 
practitioners, and the judiciary have often acknowledged this lack of 
statutory direction.53  As articulated by Paul Hodnefield, “Revised 
Article 9 offers no standard for determining the name of an individual.”54  
Rather, Hodnefield noted that section 9-503(a)(4)(A) provides a 
somewhat circular requirement that a financing statement sufficiently 
provides the name of an individual debtor if it provides the individual 
name of the debtor.55  Likewise, the Tenth Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate 
Panel has lamented the fact that the UCC “does not provide any detail as 
to the name that must be provided for an individual debtor.”56  Therefore, 
it is clear that Revised Article 9 fails to provide a functional standard for 
evaluating whether a particular individual name is sufficient for purposes 
of filing an effective financing statement.  Based on the text of the statute 
alone, it appears that Revised Article 9 has not entirely eliminated the 
problems of interpretation regarding debtor names that existed under 
former Article 9. 
The deficiencies in section 9-503(a) regarding individual debtor 
names not only engender theoretical debate, but also add to the practical 
uncertainty faced by those filing an initial financing statement or 
searching filing-office records.  Because neither a clear standard for 
compliance nor effective statutory guidance exists, filers must exercise 
their best judgment regarding the name of an individual debtor and hope 
that a court deems such name sufficient if subsequently challenged.57  
While an individual’s name may seem obvious, many factors can 
complicate matters for financing-statement filers.  For example, it is not 
uncommon for people to change their name, be known by more than one 
                                                     
 52. See id. §§ 1-201, 9-102 (neither of which define the name of a debtor); see also Pankratz 
Implement Co. v. Citizens Nat’l Bank, 130 P.3d 57, 65 (Kan. 2006) (acknowledging that section 9-
503 provides no specific rule or guidance concerning what constitutes a sufficient debtor name and 
further noting that the terms “name,” “name of debtor,” “debtor’s name,” and “correct name” are not 
defined in Article 9). 
 53. See, e.g., HAWKLAND ET AL., supra note 11, § 9-503:5 (noting that as with former Article 9, 
Revised Article 9 provides little guidance on how to handle different names used by a particular 
individual). 
 54. Hodnefield, supra note 6, at 1; see also U.C.C. § 9-503(a)(4)(A) (stating that a financing 
statement “sufficiently provides the name of the debtor” when “it provides the individual . . . name 
of the debtor”). 
 55. Hodnefield, supra note 6, at 1. 
 56. Clark v. Deere & Co. (In re Kinderknecht), 308 B.R. 71, 75 (B.A.P. 10th Cir. 2004). 
 57. See HAWKLAND ET AL., supra note 11, § 9-503:5 (discussing the difficulties of identifying 
an individual debtor name); Hodnefield, supra note 6, at 2 (stating that filers must use their “best 
judgment as to the correct debtor name and hope for the best”). 
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name, use variants or derivatives of their name, or possess various forms 
of identification listing inconsistent names.58  In addition, when 
conducting an investigation into the debtor’s name, a filer may encounter 
documentation that lists an incorrect debtor name, identifies conflicting 
debtor names, or differs from the name generally used by the debtor.59  
With the lack of statutory guidance and the introduction of individual 
judgment, it is not hard to see why the debtor name selected by the filer 
of a financing statement, although reasonable, may ultimately differ from 
the name selected by a subsequent filer or searcher.60  Accordingly, a 
filer risks losing priority to a debtor’s property and a seemingly perfected 
security interest if a court subsequently deems the individual name used 
by the filer insufficient.61 
Likewise, UCC searchers are not exempt from uncertainty arising 
from the lack of a clear sufficiency-of-a-debtor-name standard.  Because 
subsequent creditors are charged with searching filing-office records to 
                                                     
 58. See HAWKLAND ET AL., supra note 11, § 9-503:5. 
 59. See, e.g., Genoa Nat’l Bank v. Sw. Implement, Inc. (In re Borden), 353 B.R. 886, 887–88 
(Bankr. D. Neb. 2006) (explaining that the debtor’s legal name was “Michael Borden” and stated as 
such on many legal documents such as the debtor’s birth certificate, driver’s license, real estate 
deeds, bank accounts, tax returns, and bankruptcy petition, but the name “Mike Borden” was often 
signed on legal documents such as tax returns, security documents, and financial statements); In re 
Gustafson, 14 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 231, 232–33 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1973) (stating that the 
debtor’s legal name was “Arthur J. Gustafson,” but the debtor routinely used the name “Arthur J. 
Gustavsen,” which was incorrectly spelled on his chauffer’s license and subsequently used by him in 
connection with secured-loan transactions, title to real estate, telephone listings, and employment). 
 60. A number of cases highlight the types of problems that filers and searchers face when trying 
to determine an individual debtor’s name.  See, e.g., Clark, 308 B.R. at 72 (noting that the first filer 
listed the debtor’s commonly used nickname “Terry,” which was the name that the debtor signed on 
his Chapter 7 petition, instead of the debtor’s full legal name of  “Terrance”); In re Gustafson, 14 
U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) at 232–33 (noting that the debtor obtained a chauffeur’s license that 
erroneously spelled his name as “Gustavsen” instead of “Gustafson” and subsequently began using 
the incorrectly spelled name as a matter of convenience after unsuccessfully trying to get the error 
fixed, including routine use of the incorrect name for acquiring secured loans and taking and deeding 
of title to real estate); Corona Fruits & Veggies, Inc. v. Frozsun Foods, Inc., 48 Cal. Rptr. 3d 868, 
869–71 (Ct. App. 2006) (noting that the first secured party filed a financing statement identifying the 
debtor as “Armando Munoz,” apparently due to Latin American naming conventions, and the second 
secured party subsequently filed a financing statement identifying the debtor as “Armando Juarez” 
using American naming traditions); All Bus. Corp. v. Choi, 634 S.E.2d 400, 400, 405 (Ga. Ct. App. 
2006) (noting that the first filer was deemed to have an unperfected security interest after filing a 
financing statement under the name “Gu, SangWoo” when a subsequent search under the name 
“Sang Woo Gu” failed to disclose the financing statement). 
 61. See, e.g., Clark, 308 B.R. at 76–77 (ruling that the bankruptcy court erred in finding that a 
financing statement that named the debtor by a commonly used nickname in lieu of the debtor’s 
legal name was not seriously misleading and holding that the erroneous financing statement was 
ineffective because a search of the debtor’s legal name failed to reveal any matches, thereby 
rendering the safe harbor of section 9-506(c), as adopted in Kansas, inapplicable). 
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locate preexisting security interests,62 the lack of clarity regarding 
sufficient debtor names means that searchers have no idea what debtor 
name to search.  Therefore, subsequent creditors attempting to determine 
whether a potential debtor’s property is already encumbered must bear 
the risk that their efforts to search the filing-office records may fail to 
disclose the existence of a recorded financing statement where a prior 
filer used a different name or variant of the potential debtor’s name.  In 
such instances, a subsequent creditor runs the risk of entering into a 
secured transaction with a debtor under the erroneous belief that the 
debtor’s performance is secured by a first-priority security interest in 
certain debtor property when another creditor may have already obtained 
a valid security interest in the same property.  Disputes between filers 
and searchers in those exact circumstances are all too common.63 
Unfortunately, like searchers and filers, courts interpreting and 
applying the sufficiency-of-an-individual-debtor-name provisions in 
Revised Article 9 have also struggled with the lack of statutory 
guidance.64  Instead of providing clear guidance on what section 9-
503(a)(4)(A) requires, courts appear to have done little more than 
identify insufficient debtor names.65  The inability of filers to rely with 
any amount of certainty on the effectiveness of a recorded financing 
statement and subsequent creditors to trust that a particular search will 
disclose all relevant financing statements presents a stark contrast to the 
commercial certainty that was intended by the drafters of Revised  
Article 9.66  The problems faced by filers and searchers are especially 
troublesome in light of the number and value of secured transactions 
involving individual debtors.67  As such, it is clear that the existing  
                                                     
 62. See, e.g., Corona Fruits & Veggies, 48 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 869 (noting that the debtor’s name is 
particularly important because financing statements are indexed under the name of the debtor and 
those who wish to find them search under the debtor’s name). 
 63. Following the adoption of Revised Article 9, a number of court cases have centered on 
disputes between filers and searchers regarding competing claims to a debtor’s property.  These 
disputes largely involve similar facts whereby the searcher was unable to locate a previously filed 
financing statement when searching the filing-office records under the debtor’s name.  See, e.g., 
Clark, 308 B.R. at 76; In re Gustafson, 14 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) at 232–33; Corona Fruits 
& Veggies, 48 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 870; Choi, 634 S.E.2d at 405. 
 64. See, e.g., Clark, 308 B.R. at 75 (noting the lack of statutory guidance); Pankratz Implement 
Co. v. Citizens Nat’l Bank, 130 P.3d 57, 65 (Kan. 2006) (acknowledging that section 9-503, as 
adopted in Kansas, “provides no specific rule or guidance”). 
 65. Hodnefield, supra note 6, at 2. 
 66. See, e.g., Pankratz, 130 P.3d at 63 (noting that the intent of Revised Article 9 was to fix and 
make certain the name-of-the-debtor requirement). 
 67. See Hodnefield, supra note 6, at 2. 
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sufficiency-of-an-individual-debtor-name standard provides filers and 
searchers with little comfort or certainty in their secured transactions. 
2. Registered-Organization Debtor Names 
While section 9-503(a) is essentially silent on a standard for 
individual debtor names, it sets forth a slightly more detailed approach 
for determining when the name of a registered-organization debtor is 
sufficient.  Under section 9-503(a)(1), a “financing statement sufficiently 
provides the name of” a registered-organization debtor “only if the 
financing statement provides the name of the debtor indicated on the 
public record of the debtor’s jurisdiction of organization which shows the 
debtor to have been organized.”68  For purposes of Revised Article 9, a 
“registered organization” is broadly defined to include any entity that is 
organized under state or federal law so long as the appropriate 
jurisdiction maintains a public record showing that the entity was 
organized.69  Thus, the definition of registered organization ordinarily 
includes any corporation, limited partnership, or limited liability 
company.70  Stated another way, “virtually all debtors other than sole 
proprietorships and other individuals, general partnerships, decedent’s 
estates, trusts, and foreign corporations will be registered organizations” 
under Revised Article 9.71 
At first glance, the requirements for determining a sufficient 
registered-organization name appear quite explicit.72  The process for 
determining the correct debtor name for a registered organization, 
however, is not without some room for error.  As an initial matter, filers 
can fail to file an effective financing statement by misspelling the 
debtor’s name or by relying on an incorrect name provided by the 
debtor.73  Even so, the primary problem is that the test for determining a 
                                                     
 68. U.C.C. § 9-503(a)(1) (2009). 
 69. Id. § 9-102(a)(70). 
 70. Id. § 9-503 cmt. 2. 
 71. HAWKLAND ET AL., supra note 11, § 9-503:2. 
 72. See id. (noting that the standard for registered organizations “provides ‘no wiggle room’” 
and that a “financing statement must match exactly the name on the public record evidencing the 
existence of the registered organization”). 
 73. See, e.g., Miller v. Van Dorn Demag Corp. (In re Asheboro Precision Plastics, Inc.), No. 
03-11319C-7G, 2005 WL 1287743, at *1–2, *8 (Bankr. M.D.N.C. Mar. 1, 2005) (holding that the 
first filer’s financing statement was rendered ineffective due to use of the trade name “Wade 
Technical Molding, Inc.” instead of the debtor’s legal name “Asheboro Precision Plastics, Inc.,” 
even though the filer was allegedly induced into doing so by the debtor’s misrepresentation of its 
legal name); Receivables Purchasing Co. v. R & R Directional Drilling, LLC, 588 S.E.2d 831, 832–
33 (Ga. Ct. App. 2003) (explaining that the first filer lost its perfected security interest in certain 
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sufficient registered-organization name contains some ambiguity.  
Although filers are directed to use the name on a public record showing 
the debtor to be organized, uncertainty regarding a sufficient registered-
organization name arises because the term “public record” is undefined.74  
Presumably, the drafters of Revised Article 9 intended for section 9-
503(a)(1) to require that filers list the name appearing on the registered 
organization’s filed formation document—the name on a corporation’s 
certificate of incorporation or charter—which is generally considered the 
best practice when the debtor is a registered organization.75  
Notwithstanding this established best practice, public records other than 
the filed formation document of a registered organization can arguably 
comply with this standard.76  For example, the name of a registered 
organization as set forth on a state business-entity index or a state 
certificate of good standing would appear to comply with the plain 
language of the statute.77  A state business-entity index will typically 
contain the name of all entities organized in the state and allow the 
public to search for the status of an organization or the availability of a 
business name.78  Likewise, a certificate of good standing is typically 
                                                                                                                       
collateral due to an error in filing a financing statement under the name “Net work Solutions, Inc.” 
instead of “Network Solutions, Inc.”). 
 74. See U.C.C. §§ 1-201, 9-102 (neither of which define “public record”). 
 75. See First Cmty. Bank of E. Tenn. v. Jones (In re Silver Dollar, LLC), 388 B.R. 317, 319–24 
(Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 2008) (analyzing the sufficiency-of-a-registered-organization-name requirement 
and concluding that notwithstanding the lack of statutory guidance, a filer is required to provide one 
single name for a registered organization—the organizational name of the debtor and not a later 
registered assumed name); HAWKLAND ET AL., supra note 11, § 9-503:2 (interpreting section 9-503 
to require the use of the name as it appears on a charter, certificate of incorporation, or other “basic 
constitutive document” when the debtor is a corporation, limited partnership, limited liability 
company, or another similar entity); Livingston, supra note 11, at 128 (concluding that for registered 
organizations, “the debtor’s correct name is clearly, and solely, its official registered name”); 
Sigman, supra note 5, at 861–62 (giving an example where the failure to provide the name on a 
corporate charter would be prima-facie insufficient but would be saved by the safe harbor of section 
9-506(c)); Meghan M. Sercombe, Note, Good Technology and Bad Law: How Computerization 
Threatens Notice Filing Under Revised Article 9, 84 TEX. L. REV. 1065, 1067 (2006) (recognizing 
that Article 9 “requires that the name of the debtor as reflected in its articles of organization be 
provided on the financing statement”); Hodnefield, supra note 6, at 3 (stating that the drafters of 
Revised Article 9 intended for section 9-503(a)(1) to be satisfied by using the name on “the articles 
of incorporation or equivalent formation documents”). 
 76. See Hodnefield, supra note 6, at 3; see also Jones, 388 B.R. at 320 (describing a situation 
where the filer argued that a registered assumed name meets the requirement to provide the name 
indicated on the public record of the debtor’s jurisdiction of organization). 
 77. See Hodnefield, supra note 6, at 3 (noting that state business-entity indexes and certificates 
of good standings arguably comply with section 9-503(a)(1)). 
 78. Id. (noting that a state business-entity index “generally makes some or all of [its] data 
available to the public, often for free over the Internet,” and allows the public “to look up the status 
of an organization or search for [business] name availability”).  For an example of an online state 
business-entity index, see Corporations Search, WASHINGTON SECRETARY OF STATE, 
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available to the public and can show that a particular entity is properly 
organized in the state.79  In fact, as a matter of practice, many filers look 
to sources such as a state business-entity index or certificate of good 
standing, rather than the applicable filed formation documents, for the 
name of a registered organization.80  Because the plain language of 
section 9-503(a)(1) leaves the applicable public record open to 
interpretation, a potential conflict may arise when different public 
records that arguably comply with section 9-503(a)(1) list different 
names for a particular registered organization.81  Thus, with respect to the 
sufficiency of a registered-organization name, filers and searchers must 
still deal with some level of uncertainty due to the lack of precision in the 
statutory language of section 9-503(a)(1). 
In addition, some courts have struggled to evaluate the sufficiency of 
a registered-organization name in real-life circumstances requiring the 
application of section 9-503(a)(1).  For example, in In re EDM Corp., a 
secured party filed a financing statement listing the debtor’s legal name 
and a putative trade name—“‘EDM Corporation d/b/a EDM 
Equipment.’”82  Because Revised Article 9 makes it clear that the 
inclusion of a trade name does not render a financing statement 
ineffective,83 the first secured party ostensibly satisfied the requirement 
to provide a sufficient debtor name.84 
After conducting a search of the filing-office records using the 
debtor name on file with the Secretary of State and failing to discover the 
first secured party’s financing statement, a subsequent secured party also 
filed a financing statement, using the legal name “‘EDM Corporation’” 
                                                                                                                       
http://www.sos.wa.gov/corps/corps_search.aspx (allowing the public to search for corporations 
registered with the Office of the Secretary of State) (last visited Sept. 7, 2010). 
 79. See Hodnefield, supra note 6, at 3. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Hodnefield notes that business indexes were not intended to provide the name of a 
registered organization for purposes of a financing statement and often have varying data-entry rules 
that modify entity names with abbreviations, omissions, or rearranged word order.  Id.  In addition, 
the name on a certificate of good standing can also be problematic because it often lists the name 
found in the state business index.  Id.  Consequently, the name may not always match the name set 
forth in the formation documents. 
 82. 68 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (West) 139, 140 (Bankr. D. Neb. 2009). 
 83. See U.C.C. § 9-503(b)(1), (c) (2009); see also Clark v. Deere & Co. (In re Kinderknecht), 
308 B.R. 71, 74 (B.A.P. 10th Cir. 2004) (noting that the prevailing view is that the actual 
organizational name of a debtor is necessary and sufficient, whether or not the financing statement 
provides trade or other names of the debtor); HAWKLAND ET AL., supra note 11, § 9-503:7 
(discussing trade names). 
 84. See Livingston, supra note 2 (noting that the first filer in In re EDM Corp. appeared to have 
complied with the requirement to provide a sufficient debtor name). 
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without referencing the trade name.85  Based on these facts, it would 
appear that the first filer established priority over the subsequent filer.86  
Nonetheless, the court came to the surprising conclusion that the first 
financing statement was invalid and determined that the second filer had 
priority to the collateral.87  The court apparently based its decision on the 
fact that a search of the filing office’s database using the name “‘EDM 
Corporation’” failed to reveal the first secured party’s recorded financing 
statement.88  The court admitted the difficulty of its decision because the 
first filer “acted in a manner that many would consider to be prudent”—
filing under the debtor’s legal name and another name by which the 
debtor was known.89  Nonetheless, the court appeared to side with the 
second filer because the first filer’s financing statement, although 
apparently sufficient under section 9-503, was not disclosed in a search 
of the debtor’s legal name.90 
In doing so, the court seemed to have mistakenly relied on the test 
set forth in section 9-506(c), which only applies to save a financing 
statement that fails to comply with section 9-503(a) from being rendered 
ineffective.91  Thus, the court in EDM Corp. appears to have come to the 
illogical conclusion that a financing statement apparently satisfying the 
sufficiency-of-a-debtor-name requirements of section 9-503(a)(1) was in 
fact ineffective for failure to also satisfy section 9-506(c).92  This 
                                                     
 85. In re EDM Corp., 68 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (West) at 141. 
 86. See Livingston, supra note 2. 
 87. In re EDM Corp., 68 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (West) at 143.  The first secured party argued that 
the financing statement complied with Article 9 because it contained the debtor’s legal name, EDM 
Corporation, as required by section 9-503(a), and that comment 2 to section 9-503 further allowed 
creditors to add a debtor trade name to the financing statement.  Id. at 142–43.  The subsequent 
secured party countered that the financing statement was invalid as seriously misleading because it 
was not revealed in a search using the debtor’s correct legal name.  Id. at 142. 
 88. See id. at 143. 
 89. Id. 
 90. See id.  Presumably, the court felt that the searcher should not be responsible for the failure 
of a state’s standard search logic to disclose an arguably effective financing statement. 
 91. Livingston, supra note 2 (noting that the court arguably applied section 9-506(c) incorrectly 
because it applies only if the secured party’s financing statement fails to sufficiently provide the 
name of a debtor in accordance with section 9-503(a)); see also Hillinger, supra note 17 
(encouraging filers to provide all possible names because a wrong name does not count against the 
filer if one of the names given is correct). 
 92. See In re EDM Corp., 68 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (West) at 143–44 (commenting on the apparent 
illogic of its decision by specifically stating that the prior secured party acted in a manner that many 
would consider prudent and expressing surprise that the Secretary of State search engine would fail 
to find the financing statement); see also Livingston, supra note 2 (reasoning that “the court 
apparently felt trapped by [section] 9-506(c) and the ‘single search’ standard” because the 
subsequent secured party was unable to locate the first financing notwithstanding the fact that it 
apparently complied with the sufficiency-of-a-debtor-name requirements of section 9-503(a)). 
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apparently incongruous result, coupled with the ambiguity in the 
statutory language of the standard for sufficiency of a registered-
organization name, accentuates again how the lack of a clear sufficiency-
of-a-debtor-name standard can cause heartburn for parties engaging in 
secured transactions and create difficulties for courts resolving any 
resulting disputes. 
3. Safe Harbor for Errors and Omissions 
Notwithstanding the requirements of section 9-503(a) regarding the 
sufficiency of a debtor name, Revised Article 9 recognizes that certain 
mistakes in listing a debtor’s name will not defeat the effectiveness of a 
filed financing statement.  Thus, Revised Article 9 does not require 
perfection in satisfying the content requirement for a financing statement, 
and some mistakes may be excused.93  Section 9-506 details the specific 
procedure for dealing with errors and omissions in a financing 
statement.94  Under section 9-506(a), a financing statement that 
substantially satisfies the requirements of Part 5 of Revised Article 9 
remains effective “even if it has minor errors or omissions, unless the 
errors or omissions make the financing statement seriously 
misleading.”95  As applied to errors in a debtor name, the failure to 
comply with the debtor-name requirements of section 9-503(a) will not 
defeat the effectiveness of a filed financing statement so long as the error 
is not deemed to be seriously misleading.96  Under former Article 9, 
determining whether an error was seriously misleading generally 
involved a case-by-case analysis of applicable case law.97  Under 
                                                     
 93. See U.C.C. § 9-506 (2009). 
 94. See id. 
 95. Id. § 9-506(a); see also Corona Fruits & Veggies, Inc. v. Frozsun Foods, Inc., 48 Cal. Rptr. 
3d 868, 870 (Ct. App. 2006) (interpreting section 9-506(a) of the California UCC and noting that as 
a general rule, minor errors do not affect the effectiveness of the financing statement unless the 
errors render it seriously misleading to other creditors); Livingston, supra note 2 (noting that 
Revised Article 9, like former Article 9, continues to adhere to the substantial-compliance standard 
for measuring the adequacy of a financing statement and that financing statements are still effective 
so long as they give adequate notice to third parties of the existence of a security interest). 
 96. See U.C.C. § 9-506(a). 
 97. HAWKLAND ET AL., supra note 11, § 9-506:1 (noting that under former Article 9, case law 
determined what was “seriously misleading”); see also In re John’s Bean Farm of Homestead, Inc., 
378 B.R. 385, 389 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2007) (noting that most courts adopted a reasonably-diligent-
searcher standard requiring the “court to determine, on a case-by-case basis, whether a hypothetical 
reasonable searcher would have been able to discover the non-conforming financing statement 
despite the error”); Sercombe, supra note 75, at 1067 & n.7 (noting that courts disagreed over 
whether to adopt “a bright-line rule that gave clear guidance or one that allowed fact-intensive 
inquiry” in the interest of fairness, with most courts adopting a “‘reasonable searcher’ standard” 
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Revised Article 9, errors in a debtor name are subject to a much more 
stringent test.98  Specifically, section 9-506(b) generally deems any 
financing statement that fails to sufficiently provide the debtor name in 
strict accordance with section 9-503(a) seriously misleading.99 
The only exception to this presumption is found in section 9-506(c), 
which provides a safe harbor to save financing statements with errors and 
omissions in the debtor name.100  Under section 9-506(c), a financing 
statement with an error or omission in the debtor name will not be 
seriously misleading “[i]f a search of the records of the filing office 
under the debtor’s correct name, using the filing office’s standard search 
logic, if any, would disclose a financing statement.”101  Thus, the act of 
listing an insufficient debtor name will not prove fatal if a search using 
the debtor’s correct name would nonetheless reveal the financing 
statement.  Conversely, an erroneous debtor name makes a financing 
statement “seriously misleading” and precludes perfection if a search 
under the debtor’s correct name would not disclose the financing 
statement.102  The apparent intent of the drafters in moving to a safe 
                                                                                                                       
requiring a case-by-case analysis of whether a reasonable search by a diligent creditor would have 
disclosed the nonconforming financing statement); Hillinger, supra note 18 (discussing the 
reasonably-diligent-searcher standard under former Article 9, which required a case-by-case 
analysis, and noting that the drafters of Revised Article 9 viewed this standard as discretionary, fact-
intensive, and ad hoc). 
 98. See HAWKLAND ET AL., supra note 11, § 9-503:1 (noting that section 9-506 contains very 
specific rules with respect to errors in debtor names and is not particularly forgiving with respect to 
most errors in a debtor name). 
 99. U.C.C. § 9-506(b); see also In re John’s Bean Farm, 378 B.R. at 390 (noting that an 
erroneous debtor name makes a financing statement “seriously misleading” and precludes perfection 
if a search under the debtor’s correct name would not disclose the financing statement); In re FV 
Steel & Wire Co., 310 B.R. 390, 394 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 2004) (noting that “‘[i]f a searcher searches 
under the exact corporate name of the debtor . . . and the search logic of the system does not reveal a 
trade name filing, the filing should be considered seriously misleading as a matter of law’” (quoting 
BARKLEY CLARK & BARBARA CLARK, THE LAW OF SECURED TRANSACTIONS UNDER THE UNIFORM 
COMMERCIAL CODE ¶ 2.09[1][b] (2003))); HAWKLAND ET AL., supra note 11, § 9-506:2 (noting that 
an error in the debtor name is seriously misleading if it is not provided in accordance with section 9-
503); G. Ray Warner, Using the Strong-Arm Power to Attack Name Errors Under Revised Article 9, 
AM. BANKR. INST. J., Oct. 2001, at 22, 22 (noting that “a name error is fatal if a search under the 
correct name, using the filing office’s standard search logic, would not disclose the financing 
statement”); Livingston, supra note 2 (noting that Revised Article 9 takes a stronger stand than 
former Article 9, such that any error or failure to comply with section 9-503(a) results in a court 
presumptively deeming the financing statement seriously misleading). 
 100. See U.C.C. § 9-506(c). 
 101. Id.; see also HAWKLAND ET AL., supra note 11, § 9-506:2 (noting that some cases 
previously used a similar standard, but others were more forgiving and held valid financing 
statements that would not have been discovered by a search under a debtor’s correct name). 
 102. See, e.g., In re John’s Bean Farm, 378 B.R. at 390 (noting that “[u]nder revised Article 9 
what debtor misnomer is ‘seriously misleading’ is statutorily defined as that which would not be 
discovered under the state’s standard search logic”). 
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harbor based on a filing office’s computerized search logic was to 
accomplish three goals: (1) eliminating fact-intensive tests and ad hoc 
determinations by courts,103 (2) emphasizing that filers, not searchers, 
appropriately bear the responsibility for providing a sufficient debtor 
name,104 and (3) ensuring that UCC searchers need only conduct a single 
search of the filing-office records under the debtor’s “correct” name to 
discover all security interests affecting a particular debtor’s property.105 
Although the safe harbor found in section 9-506(c) may be intended 
to offset some of the risks facing filers and searchers attempting to divine 
the troublesome debtor-name requirements of section 9-503(a), some 
basic problems limit the ability of section 9-506(c) to fully realize the 
drafters’ goals.  As an initial matter, the foundation of the test to 
determine the applicability of section 9-506(c) requires a determination 
of the “debtor’s correct name.”106  Unfortunately, this term is undefined, 
and Revised Article 9 offers no further guidance.107  As an alternative, 
UCC filers and searchers could look to a debtor name that is “sufficient” 
under section 9-503(a) in the hopes that a court would deem a 
“sufficient” name the “correct” name.  However, as discussed above, 
there is considerable ambiguity regarding what constitutes a sufficient 
debtor name.108  Finally, many courts have interpreted the “correct” name 
to mean the debtor’s “legal” name.109  However, these courts generally 
                                                     
 103. See, e.g., Hillinger, supra note 18 (noting that the drafters of Revised Article 9 rejected the 
“discretionary, fact-intensive, ad hoc standard” under former Article 9). 
 104. See, e.g., Livingston, supra note 11, at 128 (discussing the policy rationale behind Revised 
Article 9 and the belief that it is more equitable and appropriate to demand accuracy from the filing 
creditor as opposed to “reasonable diligence” from a UCC searcher). 
 105. Id. at 125–26 (noting that under Revised Article 9, a third party need only conduct one 
search for any particular debtor). 
 106. See U.C.C. § 9-506(c) (requiring a search of the correct name to disclose the financing 
statement with the erroneous debtor name). 
 107. Neither Revised Article 9, nor the definitions of general applicability to the UCC, contain a 
definition for or further guidance about the debtor’s correct name.  See id. §§ 1-201, 9-102. 
 108. See supra Part II.B.1–2. 
 109. See, e.g., Clark v. Deere & Co. (In re Kinderknecht), 308 B.R. 71, 75–76 (B.A.P. 10th Cir. 
2004) (discussing the need for a clear-cut method for searching a debtor’s name in UCC filings and 
arguing that the logical starting point is to use the debtor’s legal name); Genoa Nat’l Bank v. Sw. 
Implement, Inc. (In re Borden), 353 B.R. 886, 890 (Bankr. D. Neb. 2006) (noting that the 
requirement of an individual debtor’s legal name on a financing system maintains the same standard 
applied to other debtor entities and establishes a clear-cut test for sufficiency, which is one of the 
stated purposes of Revised Article 9); Morris v. Snap On Credit, L.L.C. (In re Stewart), No. 04-
16838, Adv. No. 05-5090, 2006 WL 3193374, at *1 (Bankr. D. Kan. Nov. 1, 2006) (concluding that 
“the sole test of whether a financing statement is ‘seriously misleading’ is whether a searcher using 
the individual debtor’s ‘correct legal name,’ presumably the name indicated on a birth certificate or a 
name otherwise maintained in the public records . . . could locate the financing statement in 
question”); Pankratz Implement Co. v. Citizens Nat’l Bank, 130 P.3d 57, 66–67 (Kan. 2006) 
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have not provided much guidance about what constitutes a debtor’s legal 
name.110  In doing so, these courts may have failed to recognize that 
determining a debtor’s legal name may not be a simple task.111 
The lack of definitive guidance regarding a debtor’s correct name, 
which is the basis of determining the scope and applicability of the 
section 9-506(c) safe harbor, accentuates how the statute fails to provide 
satisfactory certainty for filers and searchers.  Specifically, because the 
correct debtor name is undefined, searchers are unable to seize upon the 
intended benefit of running a single filing-office search using that 
“correct” name to locate all applicable financing statements affecting a 
particular debtor.  Likewise, filers have no assurance that a search of the 
debtor’s correct name will disclose a filed financing statement.  As such, 
the lack of guidance regarding the meaning of “the debtor’s correct 
name” may lead to disputes between competing secured parties about the 
application and scope of the safe harbor, including whether it in fact 
operates to save the effectiveness of a particular financing statement that 
otherwise provides an insufficient name.112  Therefore, interested parties 
have little certainty about the practical effect of the section 9-506(c) safe 
harbor and whether courts will consistently apply the safe harbor in the 
event of a dispute. 
In addition to the ambiguity stemming from the undefined term 
“debtor’s correct name,” the safe harbor lacks uniform application 
between jurisdictions because it is dependent on the standard search logic 
of a filing office, which may differ from state to state.113  In re John’s 
Bean Farm of Homestead, Inc. highlights how state-specific search 
standards may lead to surprising results if a filer fails to sufficiently list a 
debtor name on a financing statement and must instead rely on section 9-
                                                                                                                       
(discussing practical considerations that support requiring the use of the debtor’s legal name). 
 110. See cases cited supra note 109. 
 111. See, e.g., Morris, 2006 WL 3193374, at *1 (indicating that an individual debtor’s legal 
name is the name indicated on that person’s birth certificate or another name as maintained in some 
other undefined public record); Livingston, supra note 11, at 145–46 (noting that debtors may have 
multiple “legal” names). 
 112. See, e.g., All Bus. Corp. v. Choi, 634 S.E.2d 400, 405 (Ga. Ct. App. 2006) (determining that 
the safe harbor for minor errors and omissions did not apply because a search of the filing-office 
records for both of the debtor’s correct names, which were deemed to be “Sang Woo Gu” and “CCO 
Check Cashing,” did not disclose the erroneous financing statements, notwithstanding the first filer’s 
argument that a simple stem search for “Gu” and “CCO” would have disclosed the prior filings). 
 113. See Livingston, supra note 11, at 146 (noting that the uniformity of Revised Article 9 is lost 
because of varying filing-office search logic); Hillinger, supra note 18 (noting “that state filing 
offices do not have uniform search logics, uniform searches or uniform search results” and that 
“courts in different states will develop different standards for evaluating the sufficiency of a filed 
financing statement”). 
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506(c) to save its effectiveness.114  There, the first filer argued that its 
recorded financing statement, which contained an incorrect debtor name, 
was not seriously misleading because the search of the filing-office 
records disclosed the filing.115  The first filer based this argument on the 
fact that a search of Florida’s Secured Transaction Registry Website 
resulted in the erroneous financing statement appearing sixty screens 
back from the initial search screen.116  Because Florida indexes filed 
financing statements on the Secured Transaction Registry Website, every 
search will produce a screen containing twenty names in alphabetical 
order with the exact match or closest match appearing at the top of the 
list.117  Searchers, however, can view additional names and financing-
statement records by going backward or forward one screen at a time.118 
Although the court ultimately held that the error in the debtor name 
made the financing statement seriously misleading,119 the Florida search 
process accentuates how differences in state search logics may result in 
uncertainty in the filing and search process.120  Specifically, filers and 
searchers are unable to rely on consistent filing-office search logics 
between jurisdictions.121  As such, one filing office may have a more 
expansive or narrow search logic than that used by another filing office.  
Moreover, a filing office may change or modify its search logic over 
time, which may result in an undisclosed financing statement that would 
                                                     
 114. 378 B.R. 385, 386–87 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2007).  The financing statement listed the debtor as 
“John Bean Farms, Inc.” instead of “John’s Bean Farm of Homestead, Inc.,” which was determined 
to be the correct legal name of the debtor, but because of the error in the debtor name, the court 
analyzed whether the error rendered the financing statement seriously misleading, or alternatively, 
whether the safe harbor of section 9-506(c), as adopted in Florida, excused the error.  Id. 
 115. Id. at 393. 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. at 388. 
 118. Id.; see also Hillinger, supra note 18 (noting that, in some sense, a Florida search results in 
the disclosure of “the entire UCC index of filed financing statements”). 
 119. In re John’s Bean Farm, 378 B.R. at 396 (determining that the Florida search logic leads to 
one result—a single screen on which names appear or alternatively one screen preceding or 
following the initial screen—and therefore a financing statement appearing sixty screens back from 
the initial screen is seriously misleading). 
 120. See Hillinger, supra note 18 (noting that Revised Article 9 may have done away with the ad 
hoc, case-by-case approach under former Article 9 but arguing that the UCC filing and search 
process remains a long way away from the desired certainty, objectivity, and uniformity of Revised 
Article 9). 
 121. See id.  While many filing-office search logics disregard corporate endings, some courts 
have held that a financing statement providing the debtor’s name without the applicable corporate 
ending was insufficient because a search using the filing office’s standard search logic would not 
disclose the financing statement.  See, e.g., Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors for Tyringham 
Holdings, Inc. v. Suna Bros., Inc. (In re Tyringham Holdings, Inc.), 354 B.R. 363, 363, 368 (Bankr. 
E.D. Va. 2006). 
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otherwise have been disclosed before the change.122  The effect of 
varying search logic between jurisdictions, coupled with the lack of 
clarity on how to determine a debtor’s correct name for purposes of 
applying the section 9-506(c) safe harbor, serves as ample evidence of 
the failure of Revised Article 9 to provide adequate commercial certainty 
for secured parties. 
4. Problems Resulting from Deficiencies in Revised Article 9 
In sum, the lack of a clear sufficiency-of-a-debtor-name standard in 
section 9-503(a) and doubt regarding the scope and consistent 
application of the safe harbor for debtor-name errors in section 9-506(c) 
not only create practical problems and a lack of commercial certainty for 
filers and searchers engaging in secured transactions, but also result in a 
breakdown in the effectiveness of the UCC filing and search process.  
Because the debtor name is at the heart of the UCC filing and search 
process,123 the lack of a clearly defined method for determining a 
sufficient name when filing a financing statement produces a ripple 
effect of problems throughout the UCC filing and search process. 
For filers, the problems begin with the requirement that a financing 
statement provide a sufficient name to perfect a security interest and 
ultimately give effective notice of that security interest to subsequent 
creditors.124  When dealing with individual debtors, no statutory direction 
is set forth other than to provide the individual name of the debtor.125  
Because any number of possible variations or derivatives of a name may 
arguably comply with that standard, filers must use their best 
judgment.126  The same is true with respect to sufficient registered-
                                                     
 122. Sigman, supra note 5, at 862 (noting “that a filing office may modify its search logic from 
time to time,” which may render “undiscoverable . . . a filing providing an erroneous name that was 
previously discoverable”); see also Paul Hodnefield, UCC Debtor Names—Corporate Endings Do 
Matter!, CORP. SERVICE COMPANY, 2 (July 2007), https://www.cscglobal.com/cscglobal/pdfs/UCC-
Debtor-Names-Do-Matter.pdf (suggesting that there is no guarantee that a financing statement 
currently saved by section 9-506(c) will remain sufficient because filing offices may change their 
search logic and, if the updated search logic fails to disclose the financing statement, it becomes 
seriously misleading). 
 123. See U.C.C. § 9-503 cmt. 2 (2009); Livingston, supra note 2. 
 124. See U.C.C. § 9-503(a) & cmt. 2. 
 125. See discussion supra Part II.B.1; see also Pankratz Implement Co. v. Citizens Nat’l Bank, 
130 P.3d 57, 65 (Kan. 2006) (noting the lack of “specific rule[s] or guidance concerning what 
constitutes a sufficient debtor ‘name’”). 
 126. Hodnefield, supra note 6, at 2; see also HAWKLAND ET AL., supra note 11, § 9-503:5 
(noting the practical difficulties in determining an individual debtor’s name); Livingston, supra note 
11, at 145–46 (noting that individual debtors can have “multiple ‘legal’ names”). 
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organization names.  Notwithstanding the apparent consensus on the best 
practice for providing a sufficient registered-organization name,127 
multiple names as set forth on different public records, all arguably 
complying with the standard in section 9-503(a)(1), could potentially be 
construed as sufficient.128  Faced with such a situation, a filer is 
ostensibly required to evaluate all of the possibilities and select a single 
sufficient debtor name for purposes of filing a financing statement to 
perfect a security interest.129  In doing so, the filer bears the risk of 
inadvertently failing to perfect its security interest if the name ultimately 
fails to give proper notice of the security interest and the financing 
statement is deemed seriously misleading.130  As a result, a filer may 
elect to file multiple financing statements under each possible debtor 
name to reduce the risk of unintentionally providing an insufficient 
name.131  Even so, the risk of failing to provide a sufficient name is not 
entirely eliminated because without a definitive test, filers lack any 
certainty about what satisfies the sufficiency-of-a-debtor-name 
requirement and what does not. 
Moreover, the application of the section 9-506(c) safe harbor, 
although intended to forgive minor filer errors in a debtor name, fails to 
give filers much comfort.  Specifically, the threshold test for applicability 
of the safe harbor relies on yet another undefined standard without any 
additional guidance.132  Accordingly, instead of having a definitive test 
for sufficiency of a debtor name and only being held responsible for 
affirmative errors or omissions such as spelling mistakes, filers face 
continued uncertainty about whether a filed financing statement will 
ultimately be rendered ineffective because a court disagrees with the 
filer’s best judgment of a debtor name. 
Subsequent creditors searching filing-office records for previously 
recorded financing statements affecting the property of a potential debtor 
also suffer because of the lack of a clear sufficiency-of-a-debtor-name 
standard.  Because filing-office records are organized by debtor name,133 
the lack of a precise and dependable standard prevents searchers from 
obtaining effective notice of preexisting security interests.  Specifically, 
searchers are unable to rely on filers to use a particular variation of an 
                                                     
 127. See HAWKLAND ET AL., supra note 11, § 9-503:2. 
 128. See Hodnefield, supra note 6, at 3. 
 129. See id. 
 130. See discussion supra Part II.B.2. 
 131. See Hillinger, supra note 17 (discussing filings under multiple variations of a debtor name). 
 132. See supra Part II.B.3. 
 133. U.C.C. §§ 9-503 cmt. 2, 9-519(c) (2009). 
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individual or registered-organization name when filing an initial 
financing statement and may often encounter multiple financing 
statements intended to cover a single debtor but which provide different 
variations of the debtor’s name.134  As such, searchers are handicapped 
by having to guess at the debtor name used by a prior filer.  Moreover, 
searchers are unable to locate all possibly applicable financing 
statements by conducting a single search of the filing-office records 
under the debtor’s correct name, as intended by Revised Article 9.135  
Without certainty in the search process, subsequent creditors must 
continue to bear the burden of conducting more in-depth searches under 
any possibly sufficient name to mitigate the risk of unknowingly taking a 
subordinated position to a prior filer.  Searchers, therefore, cannot fully 
rely on the notice-filing system promulgated under Revised Article 9 to 
actually give notice of a prior security interest in a potential debtor’s 
property.  In addition, subsequent creditors must deal with the fact that 
the lack of a definitive test for determining the scope and applicability of 
section 9-506(c) may result in the safe harbor being inconsistently 
applied to save the effectiveness of a financing statement with an error in 
the debtor name.136  Therefore, subsequent creditors, like filers of initial 
financing statements, often enter into secured transactions with an 
abundance of uncertainty regarding the effectiveness and relative priority 
of a particular security interest. 
In addition to causing great uncertainty for both filers and searchers 
engaging in secured transactions, the lack of a definitive sufficiency-of-
a-debtor-name standard appears to increase the likelihood of disputes 
arising between competing secured parties.  Because individual judgment 
must be used in the absence of a clear sufficiency-of-a-debtor-name 
standard, filers may use one debtor name for purposes of filing a 
financing statement while subsequent secured parties may use another 
                                                     
 134. See Hillinger, supra note 17 (discussing filings under multiple variations of a debtor name). 
 135. See Livingston, supra note 11, at 125–26. 
 136. Some courts have refused to stringently apply the single-search standard, which results in 
additional uncertainty for searchers about the exact scope of their obligations under Revised Article 
9.  See, e.g., Miller v. Van Dorn Demag Corp. (In re Asheboro Precision Plastics, Inc.), No. 03-
11319C-7G, 2005 WL 1287743, at *11 (Bankr. M.D.N.C. Mar. 1, 2005) (holding that the filer 
should have the opportunity to prove a fraud claim based on the debtor’s alleged misrepresentation 
of its name to the filer, even though an error in the debtor name, which resulted in the failure of the 
financing statement to be disclosed by a subsequent UCC search, invalidated the financing 
statement); In re Summit Staffing Polk Cnty., Inc., 305 B.R. 347, 353–56 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2003) 
(holding that even under Revised Article 9, there is some obligation on the part of a searcher to 
exhibit reasonableness in conducting a UCC search and, where a filing-office search allows the 
searcher to view additional pages of results, the searcher should check the immediately preceding 
and succeeding pages). 
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debtor name when attempting to locate existing security interests.137  
Without a clear-cut standard, alignment between filers and searchers with 
respect to a debtor name can never be attained.  Instead of providing 
greater commercial certainty, Revised Article 9 arguably facilitates a 
disconnect between filers and searchers by failing to provide adequate 
guidance on a sufficient debtor name. 
Because of this, the filing and search process breaks down and 
results in disputes instead of providing a clear and concise procedure for 
taking and giving notice of security interests.  As a result, litigation often 
ensues between filers who believe they have complied with the 
sufficiency-of-a-debtor-name requirements and subsequent creditors who 
were unable to discover a previously recorded financing statement after 
searching the filing-office records.138  Courts must then attempt to 
resolve the disputes between competing parties by interpreting the same 
ambiguous provisions of Revised Article 9 that initially troubled filers 
and searchers.  Unfortunately, courts have not been able to provide filers 
and searchers with the guidance that is lacking under the statutory 
language of Revised Article 9.139  The end result then is continued 
commercial uncertainty for both filers and searchers when engaging in 
secured transactions. 
The uncertainty faced by parties engaging in secured transactions, 
the apparent ineffectiveness of the notice-filing system, and the 
prevalence of litigation between competing secured parties all support 
the conclusion that the lack of guidance in Revised Article 9 on the 
sufficiency of a debtor name results in real problems.  Because these 
problems stem from confusion around how to comply with the statutory 
requirement to provide a sufficient debtor name, the uncertainty facing 
interested parties in secured transactions could presumably be avoided, 
or greatly minimized, if the standard for determining sufficient debtor 
names was more clearly and precisely articulated by Revised Article 9. 
                                                     
 137. See, e.g., Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors for Tyringham Holdings, Inc. v. Suna 
Bros., Inc. (In re Tyringham Holdings, Inc.), 354 B.R. 363, 364–65 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2006) (noting 
that the first creditor filed under the name “Tyringham Holdings” without the applicable corporate 
ending and a search under the name “Tyringham Holdings, Inc.” did not disclose the first filer’s 
financing statement); Genoa Nat’l Bank v. Sw. Implement, Inc. (In re Borden), 353 B.R. 886, 887 
(Bankr. D. Neb. 2006) (noting that one creditor filed under the name “Mike Borden” and another 
conducted a search under the name “Michael Borden”); All Bus. Corp. v. Choi, 634 S.E.2d 400, 
404–05 (Ga. Ct. App. 2006) (noting that the first creditor filed under the name “CCO Check 
Cashing-Buford” and the second creditor filed under the name “CCO Check Cashing” after a search 
did not disclose the first filer’s financing statement). 
 138. See cases cited supra note 137. 
 139. See Hodnefield, supra note 6, at 2 (noting that court decisions have done little more than 
identify insufficient debtor names). 
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III. LEGISLATIVE ATTEMPTS TO CLARIFY DEBTOR-NAME 
REQUIREMENTS 
The years of confusion engendered by the lack of a clear debtor-
name standard in section 9-503(a) and the lack of definitive guidance on 
how to comply with that standard has recently pushed state legislatures 
to action.  On June 15, 2007, Texas became the first state to enact a 
nonuniform amendment to Revised Article 9 with the intent of ending 
the uncertainty surrounding the debtor-name requirements of Revised 
Article 9.140  Tennessee followed suit and adopted its own nonuniform 
amendment, which became effective on May 1, 2008.141  In addition, 
states such as Nebraska and Virginia have also recently passed similar 
legislative attempts to extinguish the ambiguity surrounding the 
sufficiency of a debtor name.142  Based on the recent proliferation of 
state-specific attempts to address the debtor-name-related uncertainty in 
secured transactions under Revised Article 9, legislators finally appear to 
have started focusing on a solution for the problems that have plagued 
financing-statement filers and searchers for so long.  Thus, other states 
are likely to continue to consider and pass nonuniform amendments in 
the coming years, which could result in the erosion of uniformity in 
secured transactions.143 
A. Texas Legislation 
Texas’s nonuniform amendment to Revised Article 9 seeks to assist 
filers, searchers, and courts by adding a new safe harbor for individual 
debtor names and clarifying the existing sufficiency-of-a-debtor-name 
                                                     
 140. See S.B. 1540, Legis. Sess. 80(R) (Tex. 2007); see also Senate Research Ctr., Bill Analysis, 
TEXAS LEGISLATURE ONLINE, 1 (July 3, 2007), http://www.legis.state.tx.us/tlodocs/80R/analysis/ 
pdf/SB01540F.pdf [hereinafter S.B. 1540 Bill Analysis] (noting that the purpose of S.B. 1540 is to 
enact nonuniform changes to clarify various interpretive and other issues that have arisen in the 
years since the effective date of Revised Article 9); Hodnefield, supra note 6, at 1 (noting that S.B. 
1540 was the first legislative attempt to address uncertainty regarding the sufficiency of debtor 
names). 
 141. See S.B. 3732, 105th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Tenn. 2008). 
 142. See S.B. 1100, 2009 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Va. 2009); Legis. B. 851, 100th Leg., Reg. 
Sess. (Neb. 2008). 
 143. See Hodnefield, supra note 6, at 4 (noting that other states may follow Texas’s lead in 
addressing debtor-name issues); Memorandum from Kelly Kopyt, Int’l Ass’n of Commercial 
Adm’rs, to the Joint Review Comm. on Article 9, 3–4 (February 2, 2009) [hereinafter IACA Memo], 
available at http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/archives/ulc/ucc9/2009feb2%20iaca%20memo.pdf 
(noting that after Texas’s enactment of a nonuniform amendment, it is only a matter of time until 
others follow). 
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standard for registered organizations.  For individual debtor names, a 
new section 9.503(a)(4) has been added to the Texas Business and 
Commercial Code.144  Section 9.503(a)(4) augments the existing standard 
for sufficiency of an individual debtor name by incorporating a safe 
harbor that unequivocally makes the name shown on an individual’s 
driver’s license or state identification certificate sufficient for purposes 
of filing a financing statement.145  Specifically, a financing statement 
sufficiently provides an individual debtor name if it identifies “the 
individual’s name shown on the individual’s driver’s license or 
identification certificate issued by the individual’s state of residence.”146  
Texas’s new sufficiency standard does not replace the existing language, 
which indicates that a financing statement sufficiently provides the 
debtor name for an individual if it lists the individual name of the 
debtor.147  As such, it appears to operate as a safe harbor or alternative 
standard for sufficiency.148  Although other individual debtor names may 
still be sufficient, filers in Texas can now rely with certainty on the fact 
that a financing statement providing the name on an individual debtor’s 
driver’s license, or state identification certificate, will always satisfy the 
requirements of Revised Article 9.149 
Turning to the ambiguity surrounding the sufficiency of a registered-
organization name, the Texas amendment effectively confirms the 
consensus among practitioners that a sufficient debtor name should only 
be determined by referencing a registered organization’s filed formation 
documents.150  Under amended section 9.503(a)(1) of the Texas Business 
and Commercial Code, a financing statement sufficiently provides the 
debtor name of a registered organization 
only if the financing statement provides the name of the debtor 
indicated on the debtor’s formation documents that are filed of public 
record in the debtor’s jurisdiction of organization to create the 
registered organization and that show the debtor to have been  
 
                                                     
 144. See TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 9.503(a)(4) (West Supp. 2009); see also Tex. S.B. 
1540 (showing changes to text of section 9.503(a)); S.B. 1540 Bill Analysis, supra note 140, at 1 
(discussing changes to section 9.503(a)). 
 145. See BUS. & COM. § 9.503(a)(4). 
 146. Id. 
 147. See id. § 9.503(a)(5)(A). 
 148. See Hodnefield, supra note 6, at 2. 
 149. See BUS. & COM. § 9.503(a)(4). 
 150. See id. § 9.503(a)(1). 
TU FINAL 11/5/2010  8:00:10 AM 
112 KANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 59 
organized, including any amendments to those documents for the 
express purpose of amending the debtor’s name.151 
Thus, the Texas amendment decisively resolves any ambiguity regarding 
the exclusive source of a sufficient debtor name for a registered 
organization and assures filers that providing the name set forth on an 
applicable formation document is the only way to provide a sufficient 
name for a registered organization under Revised Article 9.152 
Under the Texas approach, filers now have significantly increased 
certainty about what section 9.503(a) requires for purposes of sufficiently 
providing a debtor name.153  So long as a filer correctly lists the name on 
a driver’s license—for an individual debtor—or the name on the 
formation document—for a registered-organization debtor—a court will 
not deem the filer’s financing statement ineffective for insufficiency of 
the debtor name.154  Notwithstanding the increased certainty afforded to 
filers of financing statements, the Texas amendment arguably does not 
provide equal benefits to a subsequent creditor who is searching for 
previously recorded financing statements covering a potential debtor’s 
property.  While the Texas amendment requires reference to a single 
definitive source for a sufficient registered-organization name, it is much 
less clear with respect to individual names.155  Instead of providing a 
single definitive source for determining a sufficient individual debtor 
name, the Texas amendment has generally been interpreted as merely 
adding a new safe harbor for filers of financing statements.156  As such, it 
                                                     
 151. Id. (emphasis added); see also S.B. 1540, Legis. Sess. 80(R) (Tex. 2007) (text of 
amendment); S.B. 1540 Bill Analysis, supra note 140, at 1 (discussing changes to section 9.503(a)). 
 152. See BUS. & COM. § 9.503(a)(1); see also Sigman, supra note 5, at 867 (noting that the intent 
of the sufficiency-of-a-registered-organization-name provision of Revised Article 9 is to “push 
secured parties to do what due diligence and good business practice would dictate anyway: confirm 
the debtor-supplied information by examining public records to be sure they know who the debtor is, 
what its status is, whether there are peculiarities in its articles, etc.”); Hodnefield, supra note 6, at 3 
(arguing that the Texas amendment merely codifies what practitioners have always considered as the 
best practice for filing against registered organizations). 
 153. See Hodnefield, supra note 6, at 2 (noting that the Texas amendment allows filers to 
provide an individual name with greater certainty). 
 154. See BUS. & COM. § 9.503(a)(1), (4). 
 155. Section 9.503(a)(1) plainly states that “if the debtor is a registered organization” the name is 
sufficient “only if the financing statement” provides the name on the debtor’s formation document.  
Id. § 9.503(a)(1).  In contrast, section 9.503(a)(4) does not go so far as to provide that the name is 
sufficient “only if” the financing statement lists the name on the debtor’s driver’s license.  See id.  
§ 9.503(a)(4).  Instead, an individual debtor name is sufficient not only if it provides the name on the 
debtor’s driver’s license, but also if it provides the individual name of the debtor.  See id.  
§ 9.503(a)(5)(A). 
 156. See, e.g., Hodnefield, supra note 6, at 1–2 (interpreting the Texas amendment to the 
individual debtor-name provisions as constituting a new safe harbor when the financing statement 
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appears that a filer can comply with the sufficiency-of-an-individual-
debtor-name requirement by providing an individual debtor name that is 
either deemed sufficient under the new driver’s license safe harbor157 or 
the existing individual-name-of-the-debtor standard.158  By not 
addressing the problems with the existing individual-name-of-the-debtor 
standard, the uncertainties that currently plague parties engaging in 
secured transactions will continue without resolution whenever a filer 
elects or otherwise fails to provide the name on a debtor’s driver’s 
license or state identification certificate.159   
 The practical effect is that filers in Texas now have a clearly defined 
method for determining a sufficient individual or registered-organization 
name with absolute certainty.160  For individual debtor names, however, 
other interested parties do not similarly benefit.  Because the Texas 
amendment only clarifies one possible way to provide a sufficient 
individual debtor name, subsequent creditors searching for recorded 
financing statements must still conduct multiple searches to mitigate the 
risk of failing to discover a prior lien affecting the property of a proposed 
debtor and guard against the possibility of a filer not using the name set 
forth on a debtor’s driver’s license.161  In addition to conducting a search 
using the name on an individual’s driver’s license or state identification 
certificate, a searcher remains responsible for any other names that might 
be deemed sufficient under the uncertain individual-name-of-the-debtor 
test under section 9.503(a)(5)(A).162  Moreover, searchers must 
presumably deal with the possibility that a debtor may have received a 
new driver’s license that sets forth a different variation of the debtor’s 
name following proper filing of a financing statement by a prior secured 
party.  Thus, the party conducting a search for recorded financing 
statements now bears the primary risk of ambiguity in the sufficiency-of-
                                                                                                                       
lists the individual’s name as shown on the individual’s driver’s license or identification but not 
operating to replace the existing individual-name requirements). 
 157. BUS. & COM. § 9.503(a)(4). 
 158. Id. § 9.503(a)(5)(A). 
 159. See Krahmer, supra note 49, at 677 (noting that while the Texas amendments offer some 
assistance with determining a debtor name, they do not resolve “the problem of misspellings, 
diminutives of name, and the like”). 
 160. See BUS. & COM. § 9.503(a)(1) (stating that debtor name is sufficient only if it provides the 
name indicated on a registered organization’s formation document); id. § 9.503(a)(4) (stating that the 
debtor name is sufficient if it lists the name on the driver’s license or state identification certificate). 
 161. See Hodnefield, supra note 6, at 2 (noting that under the Texas amendment additional 
searches may be required to find all effective financing statements filed against a particular 
individual but arguing that the additional searches are a small price to pay for added certainty when 
dealing with Texas debtors). 
 162. See BUS. & COM. § 9.503(a)(4), (5)(A). 
TU FINAL 11/5/2010  8:00:10 AM 
114 KANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 59 
a-debtor-name provisions in Texas’s version of Revised Article 9.  
Because the Texas amendment does not provide any additional guidance 
regarding what names may otherwise be deemed sufficient under section 
9.503(a)(5)(A), it fails to relieve any of the ambiguity already facing 
searchers under Revised Article 9.  In sum, Texas’s nonuniform 
amendment resolves the uncertainty faced by initial filers of financing 
statements but neglects to address the commercial uncertainty faced by 
subsequent creditors trying to discover the presence of any prior lien 
holders. 
B. Tennessee Legislation 
Although Tennessee ultimately adopted a nonuniform amendment 
that substantially follows the Texas model, Tennessee’s legislation 
originally took a divergent approach.  Effective as of May 1, 2008, 
Tennessee Senate Bill 3732 amended Tennessee’s version of Revised 
Article 9 to mimic Texas’s standard for registered organizations and 
specifically provide that a registered-organization name is sufficient only 
if the financing statement lists the name on such organization’s formation 
document.163  For individual debtor names, however, Tennessee’s 
nonuniform amendment initially expanded upon Texas’s safe harbor by 
identifying six different documents that would sufficiently provide an 
individual debtor name.164  As amended, an individual debtor name as 
identified on any of the following documents would have been sufficient 
under the Tennessee UCC: (1) driver’s license, (2) state-issued 
identification card, (3) birth certificate, (4) passport, (5) social security 
card, or (6) military identification card.165  This approach appears to be in 
accord with proposed amendments by some academics that advance the 
idea that a broadened safe harbor is necessary because the pendulum has 
swung too far in favor of the searcher while holding the filer to an overly 
stringent standard.166  Notwithstanding the superficial appeal of an 
                                                     
 163. S.B. 3732, 105th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Tenn. 2008); Bill Summary, TENN. GEN. 
ASSEMB., http://wapp.capitol.tn.gov/apps/billinfo/BillSummaryArchive.aspx?BillNumber=SB3732& 
ga=105 (last visited Sept. 8, 2010) [hereinafter S.B. 3732 Bill Summary] (discussing how Tennessee 
Senate Bill 3732 would change Tennessee’s version of the UCC). 
 164. See Tenn. S.B. 3732; S.B. 3732 Bill Summary, supra note 163; see also Paul Hodnefield, 
Tennessee Begins Another UCC Article 9 Transition Period, A.B.A. SEC. BUS. L., 1 (July 2008), 
http://www.abanet.org/buslaw/committees/CL190000pub/newsletter/200807/hodnefield.pdf (dis-
cussing the safe harbor created by Tennessee Senate Bill 3732). 
 165. Tenn. S.B. 3732; S.B. 3732 Bill Summary, supra note 163. 
 166. See Livingston, supra note 11, at 154–65 (discussing the need for an expanded safe harbor 
and the adoption of a standardized search logic that is more flexible). 
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approach that sets forth a list of readily available documents for purposes 
of identifying a sufficient individual debtor name, the initial Tennessee 
amendment immediately came under fire for substantially increasing the 
burdens on those conducting lien searches.167  In short, the multiple 
options available for a sufficient individual debtor name essentially 
would have required searchers to check each of the six documents and 
run multiple searches where the name differed.168  Moreover, the addition 
of the expanded safe harbor failed to address the underlying ambiguities 
of the current sufficiency-of-an-individual-debtor-name standard, which 
would continue to exist.169 
In light of this monumental shift of responsibility onto searchers, 
Tennessee legislators quickly enacted Senate Bill 372, effective as of 
June 13, 2008, to reduce the number of acceptable documents for 
identifying a sufficient individual debtor name.170  In doing so, 
Tennessee essentially adopted the Texas model for individual names and 
amended section 9-503(a)(4) to state that an individual debtor name is 
sufficient “if the financing statement provides the individual’s name 
shown on the individual’s driver’s license or identification license issued 
by the individual’s state of residence.”171  The Tennessee amendment 
makes it clear that the driver’s license and state identification license are 
not the exclusive means of sufficiently providing an individual debtor 
name.172  Tennessee Senate Bill 372 and the Official Comments to 
section 9-503 indicate that the legislature intended to provide “a safe 
harbor” such that “an individual’s name, as shown on the individual’s 
driver’s license or state-issued identification license, shall always be a 
sufficient name . . . for financing statement purposes.”173  However, the 
safe harbor “is not the exclusive means of establishing that the debtor’s 
name is sufficient,” and “[a]n individual debtor’s name may also be 
established by [other means].”174  As such, searchers must presumably 
                                                     
 167. Hodnefield, supra note 164, at 2. 
 168. Id.; Paul Hodnefield, Survey of 2008 Article 9 Legislation, CSC FLASH NEWSLETTER, 1–2 
(April 2008), http://www.complianceflash.com/archives/2008_04/pdf/article2.pdf. 
 169. See Tenn. S.B. 3732. 
 170. See S.B. 372, 105th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Tenn. 2008); see also TENN. CODE ANN.  
§ 47-9-503(a)(4) (West Supp. 2010) (codified version of Tennessee Senate Bill 372). 
 171. TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-9-503(a)(4); see also id. § 47-9-503(f) (defining the phrase 
“identification license issued by the individual’s state of residence” as meaning “the photo 
identification license authorized by [Tennessee Code] § 55-50-336” or, if the individual is not a 
resident of Tennessee, “an equivalent state-issued identification license issued by the state of the 
individual’s residence in lieu of a driver’s license”). 
 172. See id. § 47-9-503(a)(5)(A). 
 173. Tenn. S.B. 372. 
 174. Id. 
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remain mindful of other names that might also be sufficient under the 
existing individual-name-of-the-debtor test.175  Therefore, Tennessee’s 
nonuniform amendment, like the Texas legislation, increases commercial 
certainty for those filing financing statements but overlooks any 
revisions aimed at similarly assisting searchers in identifying preexisting 
liens. 
C. Other State Legislation 
In addition to Texas and Tennessee, other states have also enacted 
nonuniform amendments aimed at clarifying the sufficiency-of-a-debtor-
name provisions in Revised Article 9.  In both Nebraska176 and 
Virginia,177 nonuniform amendments have recently been adopted.  While 
Virginia largely followed the model advanced by Texas and ultimately 
adopted by Tennessee,178 Nebraska initially tested a unique approach 
before ultimately reverting to the preamendment form of the statute.179 
Notwithstanding Nebraska’s recent decision to abandon its 
nonuniform amendment in favor of retaining the preamendment 
language, Nebraska’s efforts to provide added certainty for parties 
engaging in secured transactions highlights the potential pitfalls of state-
specific nonuniform amendments.  Specifically, Nebraska’s nonuniform 
amendment sought to amend the scope of the section 9-506(c) safe 
harbor instead of addressing the underlying ambiguity in the sufficiency-
of-a-debtor-name requirements of section 9-503(a).180  Before the 
enactment of its nonuniform amendment, Nebraska’s safe harbor was 
                                                     
 175. See TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-9-503(a)(5)(A). 
 176. Legis. B. 851, 100th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Neb. 2008); Legis. B. 308A, 100th Leg., 2d Sess. 
(Neb. 2008). 
 177. S.B. 1100, 2009 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Va. 2009); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.9A-503(a)(4), 
(a)(5)(A), (f) (West Supp. 2010). 
 178. Like Texas and Tennessee, Virginia adopted an amendment that adds a safe harbor for 
financing statements providing the name of an individual debtor as set forth on the debtor’s driver’s 
license or state-issued identification card.  See VA. CODE ANN. § 8.9A-503(a)(4); see also id.  
§ 8.9A-503(f) (defining what constitutes a state-issued identification card).  In addition, financing 
statements that provide the “individual . . . name of the debtor” will continue to be sufficient.  See id. 
§ 8.9A-503(a)(5)(A).  The Virginia amendment departs from the Texas and Tennessee model for the 
sufficiency-of-a-registered-organization-name standard, where no changes were made.  See id.  
§ 8.9A-503(a)(1). 
 179. See Neb. Legis. B. 851 (enacting Nebraska’s nonuniform amendment to the UCC); Neb. 
Legis. B. 308A (delaying the effective date of Nebraska’s nonuniform amendment to the UCC); 
Legis. B. 751, 101st Leg., 2d Sess. (Neb. 2010) (repealing Nebraska’s nonuniform amendment and 
returning section 9-506(c) to its original uniform text); NEB. REV. STAT. U.C.C. § 9-506(c) (West 
Supp. 2010) (reflecting Nebraska’s decision to revert to the preamendment version of the UCC). 
 180. See Neb. Legis. B. 851 (amending section 9-506(c) without amending section 9-503(a)). 
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consistent with the uniform text of the UCC and only applied where a 
search of the debtor’s correct name would still disclose the financing 
statement containing the error.181  As modified by Nebraska’s 
nonuniform amendment, the scope of the safe harbor was expanded so 
that a financing statement that otherwise provided an insufficient debtor 
name would not be deemed seriously misleading 
[i]f a search of the records of the filing office under the debtor’s correct 
name, or, in the case of a debtor who is an individual, the debtor’s 
correct last name, using the filing office’s standard search logic, if any, 
would disclose a financing statement that fails sufficiently to provide 
the name of the debtor in accordance with section 9-503(a).182 
In doing so, Nebraska’s nonuniform amendment apparently intended to 
provide added security to filers by broadening the application of the 
existing safe harbor for debtor-name errors and omissions so that any 
financing statement correctly listing an individual debtor’s last name 
would be saved from ineffectiveness for failure to sufficiently provide 
the debtor name in accordance with section 9-503(a).  Because a 
financing statement wholly lacking a first name would presumably be 
disclosed in a search so long as the last name of the individual was 
properly listed, the Nebraska legislation essentially removed any 
incentive for a filer to list the correct first name of a debtor.183  Stated 
another way, all mistakes in the first name of an individual debtor would 
be excused under Nebraska’s nonuniform amendment.184  In addition, it 
appeared that any mistakes in an individual debtor’s last name would 
continue to be excused so long as a search using the correct last name 
                                                     
 181. See id.; see also U.C.C. § 9-506(c) (2009) (text of the uniform version of the safe harbor). 
 182. See Neb. Legis. B. 851 (emphasis added). 
 183. Paul Hodnefield, Nebraska UCC Legislation May Create New Due Diligence Burden, CSC 
FLASH NEWSLETTER, 2 (March 2008), http://www.complianceflash.com/archives/2008_03/ 
pdf/article2.pdf; see also James M. Pfeffer, What’s in a Name? Individual Debtor Names in 
Financing Statements, NEB. LAW., July 2008, at 5, 6 (noting that errors in first names, middle 
names, or both, of an individual debtor, or the use of nicknames, would not make a financing 
statement seriously misleading); Donald L. Swanson, The UCC Drafters and Courts Got It Right: 
Allocating Risks of Error for Individual Debtor Search Issues Under UCC Revised Article 9, NEB. 
LAW., July 2008, at 9, 11 (noting that under the Nebraska legislation a filer does not have any 
incentive to even put a first name on the financing statement); Article 9 Amendments Affecting 
Debtor Name Sufficiency Requirements, NAT’L CORP. RES., 2 (March 2010), 
http://www.nationalcorp.com/pdfs/Debtor_Name_Sufficiency_Mar_2010.pdf [hereinafter Article 9 
Amendments] (noting that any financing statement with a last name could be deemed sufficient under 
the Nebraska legislation); Hodnefield, supra note 168, at 2 (noting that the effect of the Nebraska 
legislation is that the first and middle names no longer have any impact on sufficiency and any 
financing statement that matches the last name of the debtor will need to be reviewed). 
 184. See sources cited supra note 183. 
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still disclosed the financing statement.185  Therefore, under the 
nonuniform amendment, those searching for recorded financing 
statements in Nebraska would be required to bear a tremendous burden 
when conducting due diligence on potential debtors—a searcher was 
essentially charged with reviewing all of the recorded financing 
statements that resulted from a search of a particular last name.186  
Otherwise, the search would be incomplete and may have resulted in the 
searcher failing to discover a financing statement that would be saved by 
operation of amended section 9-506(c).187 
While Nebraska’s nonuniform amendment may not have imposed 
much of an incremental burden on searchers seeking to identify financing 
statements affecting debtors with unique last names, the burden would 
have risen exponentially for transactions involving debtors with very 
common last names.188  Moreover, searchers attempting to determine 
whether any filed financing statements affect the property of a proposed 
debtor could ostensibly have been required to divine the applicability of 
a filed financing statement that only listed a last name.  Thus, Nebraska’s 
nonuniform amendment managed to increase certainty for filers—but 
only at significant expense to those that must search the Nebraska filing-
office records. 
After enacting its nonuniform amendment in 2008 and delaying its 
effectiveness on more than one occasion, the Nebraska legislature 
appears to have finally recognized the undue burden that its nonuniform 
amendment imposed on searchers.  As a result, it passed Legislative Bill 
751 in 2010 to return section 9-506 back to its original form and to repeal 
Legislative Bill 851.189  Nonetheless, Nebraska’s foray into legislation 
aimed at addressing debtor-name uncertainty provides a real-world 
example of the types of problems that could face filers and searchers if 
state legislatures continue to enact nonuniform amendments and state-
specific requirements. 
                                                     
 185. See Neb. Legis. B. 851. 
 186. See Pfeffer, supra note 183, at 6; Swanson, supra note 183, at 11; Hodnefield, supra note 
183, at 2. 
 187. See sources cited supra note 186. 
 188. See sources cited supra note 186. 
 189. See Legis. B. 751, 101st Leg., 2d Sess. (Neb. 2010). 
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IV. THE NEED FOR A UNIFORM AMENDMENT TO ADDRESS AMBIGUITY 
IN DEBTOR-NAME REQUIREMENTS AND A PROPOSED FRAMEWORK 
As evidenced by the increasing number of states that have passed 
legislation aimed at clarifying the sufficiency-of-debtor-name 
requirements and the disparate approaches advanced by those states,190 a 
uniform amendment to Revised Article 9 is necessary to ensure 
continued consistency and commercial certainty in secured transactions 
across jurisdictions.  Absent such a uniform amendment, any increased 
certainty for filers and searchers resulting from state-specific 
amendments may be nullified by possibly incongruous standards 
between jurisdictions.  In fact, interested parties like the American Law 
Institute, the Uniform Law Commission, and the National Conference of 
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws have increasingly expressed 
similar concerns regarding the prevalence of state-specific amendments 
to Revised Article 9 and have stressed the need for uniformity.191 
As such, two things are clear.  First, the deficiencies in the current 
sufficiency-of-a-debtor-name standard have resulted in significant 
problems for parties in secured transactions and must be addressed by a 
clear-cut test.  Second, a uniform model should be developed for 
adoption across all jurisdictions to prevent the rise of state-specific 
requirements regarding the sufficiency of a debtor name.  While the idea 
of developing a model uniform amendment to address debtor-name 
problems has gained significant traction in recent years,192 the primary 
hurdle appears to be the inherently slow and deliberate process of 
reaching an agreement on a proposed model uniform amendment for 
consideration and adoption by each state.  Based on the relatively speedy 
adoption of Revised Article 9 in 2001,193 state legislatures would 
                                                     
 190. See supra Part III. 
 191. The American Law Institute and the Uniform Law Commission formed a joint review 
committee in the spring of 2008 to examine practical problems in the operation of Revised Article 9, 
including sufficiency-of-debtor-name issues, and to draft modifications to address those issues.  See 
Current Projects: UCC Article 9 Review Committee, AM. L. INST., http://www.ali.org/index.cfm? 
fuseaction=projects.proj_ip&projectid=21 (last visited Sept. 8, 2010); Article 9 Review Comm., 
Statutory Modification Issues List, AM. L. INST., 1 (June 24, 2008), http://extranet.ali.org/directory/ 
files/UCC9_IssuesList.pdf.  In addition, Nebraska’s controversial legislation to amend Revised 
Article 9 was delayed for the sole purpose of allowing the National Conference of Commissioners 
on Uniform State Laws to have more time to create a model approach for all states.  See Hodnefield, 
supra note 168, at 2–3; Article 9 Amendments, supra note 183, at 2. 
 192. See sources cited supra note 191. 
 193. John A. Sebert, Foreword to SELECTED COMMERCIAL STATUTES, supra note 1, at vii 
(noting that “state legislatures quickly enacted [Revised Article 9]” and that “nationwide enactment 
was accomplished in just three years”). 
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ostensibly act quickly to adopt a uniform solution to resolve debtor-name 
problems if an appropriate model uniform amendment were available. 
To contribute to the development of an appropriate model uniform 
amendment, this Article advances a proposed framework for an 
amendment to Part 5 of Revised Article 9 that centers on (1) the 
incorporation of a bright-line individual debtor-name standard that 
requires reference to a single exclusive source to evaluate sufficiency, (2) 
the clarification of the registered-organization debtor-name standard to 
eliminate ambiguity and align the existing language with the intent of the 
drafters of Revised Article 9 and accepted best practices, and (3) the 
revision of the safe harbor for financing statements with minor errors and 
omissions in debtor names to reduce the likelihood of inconsistent or 
overbroad application. 
A. Adoption of an Exclusive Source for Individual Debtor Names 
Any model uniform amendment must begin with a solution for the 
problems caused by the lack of direction in the current sufficiency-of-an-
individual-debtor-name standard.  Because the current individual-debtor-
name standard allows room for individual judgment,194 all interested 
parties—filers and searchers—would benefit from the adoption of a 
bright-line test that requires filers to provide an individual’s legal name 
exactly as set forth on such individual’s birth certificate.195  Because all 
parties would be directed to a single individual debtor name, the 
exclusive-source approach provides a clear-cut and objective test by 
essentially eliminating the possibility of disparate points of view on a 
sufficient individual debtor name and the problems arising from such 
lack of consensus.  Accordingly, this exclusive-source approach finally 
makes good on the intent of Revised Article 9 to provide a clearer and 
less arbitrary set of rules for purposes of evaluating the effectiveness of a 
                                                     
 194. See supra Part II.B.1. 
 195. Courts have discussed the benefits of a clear-cut test for determining the sufficiency of an 
individual debtor name and the intent of Revised Article 9 to move away from subjectivity and 
towards a bright-line rule.  See Pankratz Implement Co. v. Citizens Nat’l Bank, 130 P.3d 57, 66–67 
(Kan. 2006).  Moreover, courts, commentators, and academics have often noted that the name of an 
individual as set forth on a birth certificate would appear sufficient regardless of whether another 
variant of that name is also sufficient.  See Morris v. Snap On Credit, L.L.C. (In re Stewart), No. 04-
16838, Adv. No. 05-5090, 2006 WL 3193374, at *1 (Bankr. D. Kan. Nov. 1, 2006); HAWKLAND ET 
AL., supra note 11, § 9-503:5.  Therefore, a clear-cut test mandating use of the name on a birth 
certificate provides a definitive test that eliminates subjectivity in favor of an objective test that 
simply requires reference to the name on an easily obtainable document. 
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filed financing statement.196  Moreover, the exclusive-source approach 
appears to support the initial intent of the drafters of Revised Article 9 by 
maintaining an appropriate balance of accountability between filers and 
searchers197 and improving the efficiency and effectiveness of the UCC 
notice-filing system.198 
1. An Exclusive Source Provides Unsurpassed Certainty 
By mimicking the format of the existing sufficiency-of-a-debtor-
name test for registered organizations, the exclusive-source approach for 
individual debtor names would provide unsurpassed certainty by 
eliminating individual discretion from the equation and replacing it with 
a bright-line test requiring reference to a single definitive document for a 
sufficient individual debtor name.  For registered organizations, section 
9-503(a)(1) unequivocally mandates that the debtor name is sufficient 
only if the financing statement sets forth the name indicated on the public 
record evidencing the existence of the organization.199  In doing so, the 
registered-organization test for sufficiency makes it clear that only the 
exact name on an easily obtainable public source is sufficient.200 
Likewise, section 9-503(a) should be amended to add a similar test 
for determining the one and only sufficient debtor name for individuals.  
Specifically, the existing standard for individual debtor names in section 
9-503(a)(4) should be deleted.  In its place, section 9-503(a) should 
provide that a financing statement sufficiently identifies an individual 
debtor only if it sets forth the debtor’s name exactly as the name appears 
on the debtor’s birth certificate.  While birth certificates may not be as 
readily obtainable as a registered organization’s formation documents,201 
requiring filers to check such a document would not appear to be an 
undue burden.202 
                                                     
 196. See U.C.C. § 9-101 cmt. 4(h) (2009) (noting that Part 5 of Revised Article 9 was 
substantially rewritten to deal with numerous problems of interpretation and implementation); 
Hillinger, supra note 18 (discussing the intent of Revised Article 9 to create a clearer, less arbitrary 
set of rules for evaluating perfection). 
 197. See infra Part IV.A.2. 
 198. See infra Part IV.A.3. 
 199. U.C.C. § 9-503(a)(1); see also HAWKLAND ET AL., supra note 11, § 9-503:2 (noting that 
there is “‘no wiggle room’”). 
 200. See Harry C. Sigman, The Filing System Under Revised Article 9, 73 AM. BANKR. L.J. 61, 
72 (1999) (analyzing the sufficiency-of-a-registered-organization-name provision of Revised Article 
9 and concluding that it enables “filers and searchers to rely with certainty on the debtor’s exact 
name obtained from an objective and publicly available source”). 
 201. Pfeffer, supra note 183, at 7. 
 202. See Morris v. Snap On Credit, L.L.C. (In re Stewart), No. 04-16838, Adv. No. 05-5090, 
 
TU FINAL 11/5/2010  8:00:10 AM 
122 KANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 59 
With such a requirement in place as the initial test for sufficiency, 
filers would have no wiggle room in selecting a sufficient debtor name.  
If the filer was unable to follow the unambiguous mandate to provide the 
exact name set forth on an individual debtor’s birth certificate, the error 
would result in a court deeming the financing statement presumptively 
seriously misleading.203  The filer would then have the burden of proving 
the error did not make the financing statement seriously misleading 
because a search using the applicable filing office’s computerized search 
logic would disclose the financing statement notwithstanding the error.204  
If the financing statement was still disclosed, the error would not be 
seriously misleading.205  If, however, the financing statement was not 
disclosed by such a search, the financing statement would be rendered 
ineffective.206  Considered as a whole, the adoption of an exclusive-
source approach appears to greatly clarify the Revised Article 9 process 
for evaluating the sufficiency of a debtor name and the effectiveness of a 
financing statement. 
The primary benefit of clarifying the process for evaluating the 
sufficiency of an individual debtor name by adopting an exclusive-source 
approach is the resulting improvement in commercial certainty for both 
filers and searchers.  In addition to increased commercial certainty, a 
clear-cut test provides practical benefits such as simplifying the drafting 
of financing statements, simplifying the parameters of UCC searches, 
reducing the likelihood of disputes and litigation, and eliminating fact-
intensive tests.207  For example, under the exclusive-source approach, 
financing-statement filers can simply request a debtor’s birth certificate 
and copy the individual’s name exactly as it appears on that document.  
Filers will no longer have to evaluate all of the different names and 
                                                                                                                       
2006 WL 3193374, at *1 (Bankr. D. Kan. Nov. 1, 2006) (suggesting use of the name on a birth 
certificate for an individual debtor); HAWKLAND ET AL., supra note 11, § 9-503:5 (suggesting use of 
the name on a birth certificate for an individual debtor). 
 203. See U.C.C. § 9-506(b). 
 204. See id. § 9-506(c). 
 205. See id. 
 206. See id. 
 207. In concluding that a clear-cut test mandating that only one name, the debtor’s legal name, 
would be sufficient, the Supreme Court of Kansas appears to recognize that the use of a single 
sufficient name is supported by the intent of Revised Article 9 because it forecloses fact-intensive 
tests, increases commercial certainty, simplifies the drafting of financing statements, simplifies the 
parameters of UCC searches, and reduces litigation about the sufficiency of a particular name.  
Pankratz Implement Co. v. Citizens Nat’l Bank, 130 P.3d 57, 66 (Kan. 2006).  While the Supreme 
Court of Kansas does not go so far as to explain how to determine a debtor’s legal name, its analysis 
highlights the benefits of definitively requiring a financing statement to provide a single debtor name 
as set forth on a specified source or document as opposed to having a subjective standard where 
more than one name may ultimately be deemed sufficient. 
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documentation that an individual may have and make an educated guess 
regarding what name or names could be sufficient.208  Moreover, filers 
will be able to rely on the fact that only the name set forth on an 
individual’s birth certificate will be sufficient and, therefore, will no 
longer feel compelled to file multiple financing statements using 
different debtor-name variants to mitigate uncertainty over whether a 
court will deem a particular financing statement ineffective for failure to 
provide a sufficient individual debtor name.209  By removing all 
individual judgment and discretion from the equation, the process of 
filing a financing statement is greatly simplified. 
UCC searchers will also benefit from the presence of a single 
exclusive source for individual debtor names.  Because the name on a 
debtor’s birth certificate is the only sufficient individual debtor name, 
UCC searchers will finally be able to conduct one search.  Instead of 
guessing at all of the possible variations of a particular debtor’s name 
and searching each of those names to reduce the likelihood of failing to 
learn of preexisting security interests, searchers will be able to rely on a 
single search using the exact name that appears on an individual’s birth 
certificate.210  If a financing statement is not disclosed by such a search, 
the UCC searcher may assume that no effective security interests 
encumber a particular debtor’s property.  Accordingly, the exclusive-
source approach not only simplifies the requisite parameters of UCC 
searches, but also allows searchers to rely with near absolute certainty on 
the results of such searches to disclose relevant security interests. 
In light of the improved clarity and simplicity regarding individual 
debtor names under the exclusive-source approach, the number of 
disputes between filers and searchers would ostensibly be reduced.  
                                                     
 208. See HAWKLAND ET AL., supra note 11, § 9-503:5 (discussing the difficulties of identifying a 
debtor’s name); Livingston, supra note 11, at 145–46 (noting that debtors can have multiple names); 
Hodnefield, supra note 6, at 2 (noting that filers are left to use their best judgment regarding a 
debtor’s name). 
 209. See Hillinger, supra note 17 (noting that filers can protect themselves by filing multiple 
financing statements under every possible name). 
 210. The ability of searchers to rely on a single search of a particular debtor’s name as opposed 
to guessing at possible variations is uniformly supported by interpretations of the intent of Revised 
Article 9.  See, e.g., Pankratz, 130 P.3d at 63, 66 (noting the intent of Revised Article 9 to eliminate 
the need for multiple searches using variations of a debtor name and discussing the benefit to 
searchers of a clear-cut individual-debtor-name standard that would ensure that searchers need only 
conduct a search of a single debtor name without having to guess at any number of debtor name 
variations that might exist); Sigman, supra note 200, at 73 (noting that Revised Article 9 “does not 
burden searchers with the obligation to dream up every potential error and name variation and 
perform searches under all possibilities” but instead allows searchers “to rely on a single search 
conducted under the correct name of the debtor and penalizes filers only for errors that result in 
nondisclosure of the financing statement in a search under the correct name”). 
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Filers and searchers would be unambiguously directed to use the exact 
name on a debtor’s birth certificate.  With such a definitive test in place, 
the exclusive-source approach would appear to eliminate the likelihood 
of a filer using one variant of a debtor name for purposes of filing and a 
searcher using another variant of that same debtor name when searching 
the filing-office records.  As such, the exclusive-source approach appears 
to foreclose the possibility of competing claims to a debtor’s property 
arising due to discrepancies in the interested parties’ judgment about a 
sufficient individual debtor name. 
Even if a dispute or litigation were to arise under the exclusive-
source approach, courts would benefit from having meaningful statutory 
guidance and a comprehensible standard to consistently apply.  Instead 
of having to make the fact-specific evaluations required under former 
Article 9211 or being required to interpret the curiously silent test under 
the current provisions of Revised Article 9,212 courts would finally have a 
bright-line test and process for evaluating the sufficiency of an individual 
debtor name.213  Therefore, the exclusive-source approach would 
foreclose fact-intensive tests by courts in favor of the straightforward 
directive to simply determine whether the debtor name on a financing 
statement is the same as the name on the debtor’s birth certificate. 
In sum, the exclusive-source approach provides unsurpassed 
certainty for all interested parties by utilizing a bright-line test that 
greatly simplifies the statutory process for evaluating the sufficiency of a 
debtor name and the effectiveness of a financing statement.  In doing so, 
the exclusive-source approach appears to be supported by judicial 
interpretations advocating for a clear-cut test.214  Some courts have also 
indicated that such a clear-cut test actually requires filers to provide an 
individual debtor’s legal name.215  While these courts have not defined or 
                                                     
 211. See Hillinger, supra note 18 (discussing the case-by-case analysis under former Article 9). 
 212. See Pankratz, 130 P.3d at 65 (noting the lack of a specific rule or guidance concerning what 
constitutes a sufficient debtor name under Revised Article 9). 
 213. A number of courts have discussed the need for a clear-cut test under Revised Article 9 and 
the intent of Revised Article 9 to move in that direction.  See, e.g., Clark v. Deere & Co. (In re 
Kinderknecht), 308 B.R. 71, 75–76 (B.A.P. 10th Cir. 2004) (recognizing that a clear-cut standard is 
supported by a number of practical considerations); Pankratz, 130 P.3d at 67 (noting the intent of 
Revised Article 9 to move toward a bright-line rule “to lessen the need for judicial hairsplitting”). 
 214. See cases cited supra note 213. 
 215. See, e.g., Clark, 308 B.R. at 75 (concluding that the debtor’s legal name must be used to 
make a financing statement sufficient); Genoa Nat’l Bank v. Sw. Implement, Inc. (In re Borden), 
353 B.R. 886, 890 (Bankr. D. Neb. 2006) (noting that the requirement of an individual debtor’s legal 
name on a financing statement maintains the same standard applied to other debtor entities and 
establishes a clear-cut test for establishing sufficiency, which is one of the stated purposes of 
Revised Article 9); Pankratz, 130 P.3d at 66 (concluding that a legal name is necessary to 
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otherwise provided guidance on what constitutes an individual’s legal 
name,216 the exclusive-source approach builds upon the concept by 
definitively identifying that the legal name set forth on a birth certificate 
is the only sufficient individual debtor name.  Accordingly, any 
ambiguity regarding an individual’s legal name or how to treat 
individuals with multiple legal names is eliminated.  Moreover, a model 
uniform amendment that adopts an exclusive-source approach would not 
only provide a definitive test for filers, searchers, and courts, but also 
achieve the goal of Revised Article 9 to simplify the statutory text and 
deal with problems of interpretation and implementation relating to 
sufficiency of debtor names.217  Therefore, the exclusive-source approach 
provides the greatest amount of certainty for filers and searchers by 
eliminating individual judgment and the possibility of more than one 
debtor name being deemed sufficient. 
2. An Exclusive Source Provides Clarity Without Increasing the 
Burden on Searchers 
The exclusive-source approach also provides certainty in a manner 
that is consistent with the principals of Revised Article 9 because it keeps 
responsibility for financing-statement errors on the filing party instead of 
inappropriately shifting the burden onto searchers.  With the adoption of 
Revised Article 9, the burdens in litigation for errors in debtor names 
were shifted from the UCC searcher to the UCC filer.218  Instead of 
presuming a financing statement with a debtor-name error effective 
unless proven seriously misleading, Revised Article 9 made it clear that 
once an error in the debtor name is established, the financing statement is  
 
                                                                                                                       
sufficiently provide an individual debtor name). 
 216. See cases cited supra note 215. 
 217. See U.C.C. § 9-101 cmt. 4(h) (2009) (noting that Part 5 of Revised Article 9 was 
“substantially rewritten to simplify the statutory text and to deal with numerous problems of 
interpretation and implementation that have arisen over the years”); see also Clark, 308 B.R. at 75 
(noting that section 9-503 of Revised Article 9 “was enacted to clarify the sufficiency of a debtor’s 
name,” that “the intent to clarify when a debtor’s name is sufficient shows a desire to foreclose fact-
intensive tests,” and that a clear-cut test requiring provision of the debtor’s legal name is in accord 
with that intent). 
 218. See Hillinger, supra note 18 (noting that Revised Article 9 alters the burdens in litigation); 
see also In re Johns Bean Farm of Homestead, Inc., 378 B.R. 385, 390 & n.13 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 
2007) (noting that “[p]ost-revision case law is fairly well settled that the burden is squarely on the 
creditor to correctly identify the name of the debtor” and that Revised Article 9 has “altered the 
burdens in litigation”). 
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ineffective unless the filing party proves that the error does not make the 
financing statement seriously misleading.219 
In addition, Revised Article 9 replaced the reasonably-diligent-
searcher standard of former Article 9 by what has been dubbed a “single 
search standard.”220  Because former Article 9 required a reasonable 
search of filer financing statements, searchers bore primary responsibility 
for locating any preexisting liens because it was necessary to establish 
and prove the reasonableness of the scope of the search.221  A searcher 
being evaluated under the discretionary reasonably-diligent-searcher 
standard222 could plausibly be required to conduct multiple searches on 
different debtor-name variations, interpret search results, and follow up 
regarding possibly applicable liens.223  Because an error in the name of 
an individual debtor makes the financing statement presumptively 
misleading, Revised Article 9 seeks to reduce the burden on searchers by 
effectively requiring only a single search of a particular individual’s 
name.224  If that search does not result in any matches, then under 
Revised Article 9, the searcher may assume there are no filed financing 
                                                     
 219. See Hillinger, supra note 18 (contrasting former Article 9, where financing statements with 
errors were presumed valid, with Revised Article 9, which only requires a person challenging the 
sufficiency of the financing statement to show an error in the debtor name, shifting the burden to the 
filer to prove that the financing statement is nevertheless sufficient). 
 220. See, e.g., Sigman, supra note 200, at 73 (noting that Revised Article 9 allows searchers to 
rely on a single search conducted under the correct name of the debtor); Hillinger, supra note 18 
(noting that Revised Article 9 replaced the reasonably-diligent-searcher standard with a clearer 
standard based on the computerized search logic of the applicable filing office); Livingston, supra 
note 2 (comparing the Revised Article 9 single-search standard to the prerevision reasonably-
diligent-searcher standard). 
 221. See, e.g., Armstrong v. Dakota Bank & Trust Co. (In re Knudson), 929 F.2d 1280, 1283 
(8th Cir. 1991) (noting that human judgment was relevant under former Article 9 and holding that 
determinations of whether an error was seriously misleading were based on whether a hypothetical 
“reasonably diligent searcher” could discover the erroneous filing); Clark, 308 B.R. at 74–75 (noting 
that before Revised Article 9, courts had struggled with the issue of whether debtor names in 
financing statements were sufficient to put third parties on notice, with many courts typically 
applying a reasonably-diligent-searcher test). 
 222. See Dietrich-Post Co. of Wash. v. Alaska Nat’l Bank of the N. (In re McCauley’s 
Reprographics, Inc.), 638 F.2d 117, 119 (9th Cir. 1981) (noting that courts applying the standard use 
a “flexible, ad hoc approach to determine, by an essentially factual inquiry, the extent to which an 
error in the financing statement would be misleading to one undertaking a reasonable search”); 
Hillinger, supra note 18 (noting that the drafters of Revised Article 9 rejected the “discretionary, 
fact-intensive, ad hoc standard” under former Article 9). 
 223. See, e.g., Genoa Nat’l Bank v. Sw. Implement, Inc. (In re Borden), 353 B.R. 886, 889 
(Bankr. D. Neb. 2006) (giving an example of the multiple searches required under former Article 9 
and discussing the intended difference under Revised Article 9); Sercombe, supra note 75, at 1067 & 
n.7 (discussing how courts applied former Article 9’s reasonably-diligent-searcher standard). 
 224. See, e.g., Livingston, supra note 2 (interpreting Revised Article 9 to only require a UCC 
searcher to conduct a single search by entering the individual’s correct name into a search of the 
applicable filing-office records). 
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statements recorded against that particular debtor.225  The shift in 
thinking evidenced by the foregoing revision to former Article 9 
highlights the intent of the drafters of Revised Article 9 to squarely place 
responsibility for filing an effective financing statement on the 
appropriate party—the filer of the financing statement and not the party 
searching for a recorded financing statement.226 
In contrast to the nonuniform amendments adopted by Texas, 
Tennessee, Virginia, and Nebraska, which increase certainty for filers by 
inappropriately shifting the burden of erroneous debtor names back onto 
the searching party,227 the exclusive-source approach clarifies existing 
sufficiency-of-a-debtor-name ambiguities in a manner that is consistent 
with the intent of Revised Article 9 to ensure that financing-statement 
filers bear an appropriate amount of responsibility for debtor-name 
errors.228  Specifically, the exclusive-source approach provides a clear 
                                                     
 225. See, e.g., Chem. Bank v. Title Servs., Inc., 708 F. Supp. 245, 249 (D. Minn. 1989) (“Policy 
considerations behind the U.C.C. notice requirement support [the] conclusion that a searcher does 
not have a duty to hypothesize possible misspellings.”); Sw. Implement, 353 B.R. at 891 (noting that 
when the standard search logic of a filing office does not allow for expanded searches or wildcard 
functionality to cover all forms of a name, the searcher should not be required to separately search 
each possible name to ensure that all possibilities have been exhausted); Livingston, supra note 2 
(interpreting Revised Article 9 to only require further investigation by searchers if a single search of 
the debtor’s “correct” name discloses any recorded financing statements). 
 226. See, e.g., In re FV Steel & Wire Co., 310 B.R. 390, 394 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 2004) (holding 
that a “rule that would burden a searcher with guessing at misspellings and various configurations of 
a legal name” would decrease the certainty desirable in commercial transactions and that the burden 
of filing under the correct name is properly on the filer); Corona Fruits & Veggies, Inc. v. Frozsun 
Foods, Inc., 48 Cal. Rptr. 3d 868, 870 (Ct. App. 2006) (noting that the secured party, not the debtor 
or uninvolved third parties, has the duty of ensuring proper filing and indexing of the financing 
statement); Receivables Purchasing Co. v. R & R Directional Drilling, LLC, 588 S.E.2d 831, 833 
(Ga. Ct. App. 2003) (interpreting the Revised Article 9 sufficiency-of-a-debtor-name standard and 
safe harbor for errors and omissions in a financing statement as operating to place the responsibility 
for debtor-name errors on the filer and stating that a “party filing a financing statement now acts at 
his peril if he files the statement under an incorrect name”); Pankratz Implement Co. v. Citizens 
Nat’l Bank, 130 P.3d 57, 62–69 (Kan. 2006) (noting that section 9-506 of the Kansas UCC places 
the burden on the filing creditor to list the debtor name correctly and that the searching creditor is 
under no obligation to conduct searches under variants of the debtor’s name and rejecting arguments 
seeking to place responsibility on the searchers to conduct a diligent search of past records to 
determine whether a prior lien exists); Livingston, supra note 11, at 128–29 (noting that because the 
secured party has the means to find out the debtor’s correct name before filing, “it is more efficient 
and equitable to require accuracy by the filing creditor than to demand ‘reasonable diligence,’ 
however defined, from searching creditors”); Sigman, supra note 5, at 862–63 (stating that Revised 
Article 9 “reflects a balance between the need for some flexibility to allow for human error on the 
part of filers . . . and the avoidance of a rule that would cast an altogether inappropriate burden on 
searchers to have to try to divine potential errors and make searches under not only the correct name 
but also ‘foreseeable’ or ‘likely’ errors that a filer might have made”). 
 227. See supra Part III. 
 228. See, e.g., Pankratz, 130 P.3d at 62–69 (noting that filing creditors have the burden of 
correctly listing the debtor); Livingston, supra note 11, at 128–29 (noting that “it is more efficient 
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standard for both filers and searchers that maintains an appropriate 
allocation of burdens.  Under the exclusive-source approach, filers would 
only be statutorily required to complete the simple task of filing under 
the debtor’s correct legal name.229 
Admittedly, under the present provisions of Revised Article 9, this 
was not just a simple task of spelling the debtor’s name correctly, and 
matters were greatly complicated by uncertainty about what name or 
names might be sufficient.230  However, by clarifying the statutory 
requirement so that it is only satisfied by providing the exact name on the 
individual debtor’s birth certificate, the exclusive-source approach finally 
makes it simple for the filer to comply.  As noted by many courts, it is 
not overly burdensome to require filers to take care in spelling a debtor’s 
name correctly so long as it is clear what name must be spelled 
correctly.231  With problems about the appropriate name resolved by an 
exclusive-source approach that unambiguously requires filers to use the 
exact name on an individual debtor’s birth certificate, filers will only be 
charged with spelling that name correctly.  Therefore, filers benefit from 
the added clarity of the exclusive-source approach and are not overly 
burdened when trying to comply with it. 
In addition, searchers are only required to run a single search of the 
name on an individual’s birth certificate to identify all potential liens 
because all other names would be presumed “seriously misleading.”  
Searchers will no longer need to guess at all possible variations of a 
debtor name and run multiple searches to mitigate the risk of failing to 
locate a filed financing statement under a variant of a debtor’s name.  
Such a benefit for searchers is in alignment with the original, but 
unrealized, intent of Revised Article 9 to ensure that searchers need only 
                                                                                                                       
and equitable to require accuracy by a filing creditor”); Darrell W. Pierce, Revised Article 9 of the 
Uniform Commercial Code: Filing System Improvements and Their Rationale, 31 UCC L.J. 16, 17 
(1998) (noting that under Revised Article 9, “[c]ase law that has served to protect filers at the 
expense of searchers by giving effect to filings not readily retrievable by a search will be 
overturned,” which will obviate “the need for complicated search logic and multiple name 
searches”). 
 229. See, e.g., In re Fuell, 64 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (West) 722, 726–27 (Bankr. D. Idaho 2007) 
(noting that there was “no apparent reason” for the creditor’s failure to correctly provide the debtor’s 
name in a financing statement); Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors for Tyringham Holdings, 
Inc. v. Suna Bros., Inc. (In re Tyringham Holdings, Inc.), 354 B.R. 363, 368 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2006) 
(noting that “it is not that difficult to ensure that a financing statement is filed with the correct name 
of the debtor” and that “[l]ittle more is asked of a creditor than to accurately record the debtor’s 
name”); Genoa Nat’l Bank v. Sw. Implement, Inc. (In re Borden), 353 B.R. 886, 891 (Bankr. D. 
Neb. 2006) (noting that requiring the debtor’s legal name is not too great of a burden). 
 230. See supra Part II.B.1. 
 231. See cases cited supra note 229. 
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conduct a single search using the debtor’s correct name.232  Thus, the 
exclusive-source approach effectively clarifies section 9-503(a) for both 
filers and searchers without inappropriately shifting undue risk and 
burden onto the searcher.  Accordingly, the exclusive-source approach 
ensures that the allocation of responsibility and burdens under the filing 
and search process is appropriately balanced between filers and 
searchers. 
3. An Exclusive Source Facilitates the Notice-Filing System 
The exclusive-source approach also serves to facilitate and improve 
the effectiveness of the notice-filing system promulgated by the UCC.  
Under Revised Article 9, the purpose of a recorded financing statement is 
to provide notice that a person may have a security interest in the 
specified collateral of a particular debtor.233  With such notice of a 
potential security interest, further inquiry is required from the searching 
party to disclose the complete state of affairs.234  Because of ambiguity in 
what constitutes a sufficient debtor name, the effectiveness of the notice-
filing system has been compromised.235   
Currently, financing-statement filers and subsequent searchers lack a 
clear and consistent standard for determining a sufficient debtor name.236  
Accordingly, a filer’s determination of a sufficient debtor name could 
reasonably differ from the name identified by a subsequent searcher for 
the same debtor.237  Because filers are not assured of a particular debtor 
name being sufficient to give notice of a security interest, they often 
resort to filing multiple financing statements under different variants of a 
                                                     
 232. See, e.g., Pankratz, 130 P.3d at 68 (noting the intent of Revised Article 9 to allow searchers 
to rely on one search of the correct debtor name); Sigman, supra note 200, at 73 (noting that Revised 
Article 9 “does not burden searchers with the obligation to dream up every potential error and name 
variation and perform searches under all possibilities” but instead allows searchers “to rely on a 
single search conducted under the correct name of the debtor”); Sercombe, supra note 75, at 1067–
68 (interpreting Revised Article 9 as replacing the former reasonableness standard with a bright-line 
test requiring a single search under the debtor’s correct name utilizing the filing office’s standard 
search logic). 
 233. See U.C.C. § 9-502 (2009); see also id. § 9-502 cmt. 2 (noting a financing statement need 
not provide in-depth information and that the theory behind notice-filing is that the financing 
statement is only intended to indicate that a person may have a security interest in the indicated 
collateral). 
 234. See id. § 9-502 & cmt. 2; see also id. § 9-210 (setting forth a statutory procedure whereby a 
secured party may be required to make a disclosure at the debtor’s request). 
 235. See supra Part II.B.1, 4. 
 236. See supra Part II.B.1, 4. 
 237. See supra Part II.B.1, 4. 
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particular debtor name to reduce the risk of unintentionally providing an 
insufficient debtor name.  Thus, multiple financing statements may be 
filed to give notice of the same security interest in a debtor’s property, 
which compromises the ability of such filings to give accurate notice of 
such interest to a subsequent creditor.238  As a result, searchers cannot 
rely on a single search of a particular debtor name to fully disclose any 
existing security interests and must investigate multiple debtor-name 
variations when conducting due diligence.239  Even with such efforts by 
both filers and searchers, it is not uncommon for filers to file under a 
debtor name that is unidentified by a searcher’s investigation.240  This 
inability of filers and searchers to rely on the use of the same debtor 
name to ensure giving proper notice of a security interest—in the case of 
a filer—and to receive notice of an existing security interest—in the case 
of a searcher—accentuates how the ambiguity in the sufficiency-of-a-
debtor-name standard results in a breakdown in the effectiveness of the 
notice-filing system and that neither filers nor searchers are afforded 
much comfort or certainty when using the notice-filing system under the 
current provisions of Revised Article 9. 
By providing an exclusive source for a sufficient individual debtor 
name, the notice-filing system’s effectiveness in providing notice of 
recorded financing statements drastically improves.  Because only one 
name will be sufficient, filers will know with absolute certainty what 
debtor name to provide on a financing statement.  So long as the filer 
accurately provides that name, there will be no doubt about the 
sufficiency of the debtor name used.  As a result of only one debtor name 
being sufficient for purposes of filing a financing statement, searchers 
will be able to reliably receive notice of preexisting security interests by 
conducting a single search of that debtor name.  With consensus on a 
single sufficient debtor name, the need for multiple filings and multiple 
searches is virtually eliminated.  Therefore, the exclusive-source 
approach increases the efficiency of the filing and search process while 
giving filers and searchers improved certainty regarding the effectiveness 
of financing statements and the identification of existing liens. 
                                                     
 238. See supra Part II.B.1, 4. 
 239. See supra Part II.B.1, 4. 
 240. See, e.g., Clark v. Deere & Co. (In re Kinderknecht), 308 B.R. 71, 72–73 (B.A.P. 10th Cir. 
2004); In re Gustafson, 14 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 231, 232–33 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1973); 
Corona Fruits & Veggies, Inc. v. Frozsun Foods, Inc., 48 Cal. Rptr. 3d 868, 869–71 (Ct. App. 2006); 
All Bus. Corp. v. Choi, 634 S.E.2d 400, 404–05 (Ga. Ct. App. 2006). 
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B. Clarification of the Standard for Sufficient Registered-Organization 
Debtor Names 
In contrast to the sufficiency-of-a-debtor-name standard for 
individuals, the existing registered-organization provision of the UCC 
already adopts an exclusive-source approach and merely requires 
clarification of the existing language to end any ambiguity surrounding 
the initial intent of the drafters.  As such, a model uniform amendment 
need only draw upon the approach set forth in Texas’s nonuniform 
amendment for clarifying the requirements for a sufficient registered-
organization name.241  By amending the existing standard to eliminate 
any ambiguity about the single exclusive public record that filers must 
reference for a sufficient registered-organization name, filers and 
searchers would gain certainty because the names set forth on other 
arguably acceptable public records will be insufficient.242  In addition, 
this approach aligns with generally accepted best practice and requires 
only a minor clarification of the existing standard as opposed to 
wholesale change.243 
Currently, the standard for the sufficiency of a registered-
organization name creates some ambiguity because multiple public 
records can arguably satisfy it.244  With that said, commentators and 
practitioners have generally interpreted the intent of the language to 
require use of the name identified on the formation document filed with 
the applicable state of organization.245  Given the general consensus on 
the intent of section 9-503(a)(1) and the accepted best practice of 
providing the name set forth on the applicable formation document, a 
uniform amendment need only ensure that the language of section 9-
503(a)(1) unambiguously requires filers to provide the name of a 
registered organization as it appears on the entity’s certificate of 
incorporation or like document.  In doing so, a model uniform 
                                                     
 241. See TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 9.503(a)(1) (West Supp. 2009). 
 242. See Hodnefield, supra note 6, at 3 (discussing how the Texas amendment addresses 
ambiguity arising from the fact that the appropriate public record is undefined under Revised Article 
9). 
 243. See Livingston, supra note 11, at 128 (concluding that “[f]or registered organizations, . . . 
the debtor’s correct name is clearly, and solely, its official registered name”); Sercombe, supra note 
75, at 1067 (recognizing that Article 9 requires a creditor to provide the name of a debtor, as 
reflected in its articles of organization, on the financing statement). 
 244. See supra Part II.B.2. 
 245. See HAWKLAND ET AL., supra note 11, § 9-503:2; Hodnefield, supra note 6, at 3 (noting 
that using the name on a certificate of incorporation or like document is already recognized as best 
practice). 
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amendment should adopt an approach that is generally in accord with 
Texas’s nonuniform amendment to the registered-organization standard 
for sufficiency of a debtor name. 
Using Texas’s amendment246 as a model, section 9-503(a)(1) should 
be amended to simply provide that the debtor name of a registered 
organization is sufficient only if the financing statement identifies the 
name of the debtor as set forth on the formation document recorded with 
the applicable state of organization.  The name on any other public 
record, such as a state business-entity index or a certificate of good 
standing, would not be sufficient,247 subject to the safe harbor for minor 
errors or omissions in section 9-506(c).248  Therefore, for corporations, 
the relevant formation document would be the articles of incorporation or 
charter.  The debtor name of a limited liability company would be 
determined similarly by referencing the limited liability company’s filed 
articles of organization. 
Such an amendment makes it absolutely clear that filers are to 
reference a single exclusive source for the name of a registered 
organization and that all other names will be presumed “seriously 
misleading.”  Likewise, searchers must only conduct a single search of 
the registered-organization name as it appears on the applicable filed 
formation document to identify all of the security interests that already 
encumber a particular debtor’s property.  In doing so, filers and searchers 
will have improved certainty by virtue of eliminating the room for 
interpretation that currently exists.  In addition, such an amendment 
reinforces the apparent intent of the drafters of Revised Article 9 and the 
best practice adopted by most practitioners.249  Therefore, the amendment 
does not institute wholesale changes but rather offers a simple solution to 
fix the ambiguity in the original language of Revised Article 9 with little 
disruption to the existing filing and search process. 
C. Revision of the Safe Harbor for Minor Errors and Omissions 
A model uniform amendment should also resolve the uncertainty 
arising from the ambiguous reference to the debtor’s correct name, which 
is the basis of the test for determining the applicability and scope of the 
                                                     
 246. BUS. & COM. § 9.503(a)(1). 
 247. See id.; see also id. § 9.506(b) (“[A] financing statement that fails sufficiently to provide the 
name of the debtor in accordance with Section 9.503(a) is seriously misleading.”). 
 248. Id. § 9.506(c). 
 249. See HAWKLAND ET AL., supra note 11, § 9-503:2; Hodnefield, supra note 6, at 3. 
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safe harbor for errors and omissions in a debtor name under Revised 
Article 9.  As it stands, section 9-506(c) provides that a financing 
statement containing an error or omission in the debtor name will not be 
seriously misleading “[i]f a search of the records of the filing office 
under the debtor’s correct name, using the filing office’s standard search 
logic, if any, would disclose a financing statement that fails sufficiently 
to provide the name of the debtor in accordance with Section 9-
503(a).”250  The problem with the existing language in section 9-506(c) is 
that the term “correct name” is not defined in the UCC.251  Accordingly, 
it is ultimately unclear what the correct name is for purposes of testing 
whether an error renders a financing statement seriously misleading. 
To resolve the uncertainty surrounding the scope and application of 
the section 9-506(c) safe harbor, a model uniform amendment could 
replace the reference to the debtor’s correct name with a reference to a 
sufficient debtor name as required by section 9-503(a).252  If this 
approach were adopted, a financing statement containing an error in an 
individual debtor name would be excused if a search of the filing-office 
records under the exact debtor name set forth on the debtor’s birth 
certificate using the filing office’s standard search logic would 
nonetheless disclose the financing statement.253  Likewise, a financing 
statement with an error in a registered-organization name would not be 
seriously misleading if a search of the filing-office records under the 
name set forth on such organization’s formation document disclosed the 
financing statement.254  If, however, the erroneous financing statement 
was not disclosed by such a search, the error would be fatal to the 
effectiveness of the financing statement.  Instead of guessing the debtor’s 
correct name, interested parties would be directed to use the debtor name 
set forth on the applicable exclusive source for individuals and registered 
organizations.  Therefore, the process of evaluating errors in a financing  
 
                                                     
 250. U.C.C. § 9-506(c) (2009) (emphasis added). 
 251. See id. §§ 1-201, 9-102 (neither of which define “correct name”). 
 252. In addition to amending section 9-506(c) to eliminate the undefined “correct name” test, it 
should be noted that the adoption of an exclusive source for sufficiency of debtor names under 
section 9-503(a) would ostensibly reduce the likelihood of disputes between filers and searchers and, 
therefore, the likelihood that an interested party would need to rely on section 9-506(c) to uphold the 
effectiveness of a financing statement with a debtor-name error.  Specifically, with definitive 
guidance on what name to use, filers are less likely to need to rely on the safe harbor to resolve 
disputes over different names for a particular debtor.  Therefore, the safe harbor can be used when 
there are minor errors, such as spelling mistakes, in a financing statement, instead of being invoked 
because of uncertainty over how to provide a sufficient debtor name. 
 253. See supra Part IV.A. 
 254. See supra Part IV.B. 
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statement would be clearly defined and could be consistently applied to 
increase commercial certainty. 
Moreover, such an approach strikes an appropriate balance between 
ensuring that UCC searchers are not overly burdened by requirements to 
conduct multiple searches and recognizing that perfection is not expected 
or required by UCC filers.  Unlike Nebraska’s experimental approach, 
which broadened the scope of the safe harbor to the point that filers 
would have had little responsibility other than to get an individual 
debtor’s last name right,255 this approach aligns with the apparent intent 
of Revised Article 9.  As an initial matter, the use of the term “correct 
name” in the existing safe harbor appears to imply that only one name 
should be used for purposes of determining its application.256  Moreover, 
section 9-506(c) has roundly been interpreted as only requiring a single 
search on the part of UCC searchers,257 which further supports that only 
one name should be used to determine the applicability of the safe 
harbor.  Accordingly, a model uniform amendment advancing this 
approach, along with the adoption of an exclusive source for a sufficient 
debtor name, would clearly identify the one correct name as the debtor’s 
legal name as set forth by the applicable exclusive source.  Moreover, 
interested parties would have a clear and objective test for determining 
the applicability and scope of the safe harbor to save the effectiveness of 
an erroneous financing statement. 
With the sufficiency standard clearly defined and the scope of the 
safe harbor adjusted to align with that standard, filers need only obtain 
the applicable exclusive source and spell the debtor’s name correctly.  
Abiding by such a mandate should not overly burden filers who are in a 
more effective position than searchers to accurately identify a debtor.258  
If, however, a filer fails to do so, section 9-506(c) would still operate to 
excuse some errors and omissions.  Specifically, section 9-506(c), as 
amended in accordance with the approach advanced above, will only 
apply where the filer’s error does not impede the ability of searchers to 
obtain notice of the filer’s security interest when conducting a single 
search of the filing-office records under the name that the filer was 
unambiguously directed to provide under the proposed amendment to 
section 9-503(a).  Accordingly, the proposed model uniform amendment 
would ensure some continued accountability on the part of filers to get 
                                                     
 255. See supra Part III.C. 
 256. See U.C.C. § 9-506(c). 
 257. See, e.g., Livingston, supra note 11, at 127–28. 
 258. See sources cited supra note 229. 
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the debtor name right, while maintaining the responsibility of searchers 
to conduct a single search of the filing-office records for preexisting 
security interests.  Therefore, the combination of adopting the exclusive-
source approach for individual and registered-organization names and 
aligning the test for applicability of the section 9-506(c) safe harbor with 
this revised sufficiency-of-a-debtor-name standard appears to provide the 
needed clarity for filers and searchers in a way that maintains an 
appropriate balance of responsibility. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The issue of debtor-name sufficiency has plagued filers, searchers, 
and courts since the inception of Revised Article 9.  This has resulted in 
spirited discussion in legal circles and headaches for those seeking to 
comply with or interpret the requirements of section 9-503(a).  Despite 
these problems, it took nearly seven years before states attempted to 
clarify the ambiguities and deficiencies of the sufficiency-of-a-debtor-
name requirements.  With the nonuniform amendment enacted by Texas, 
the flood gates have opened.  With more states following Texas’s lead by 
enacting nonuniform legislation, the already unclear UCC filing and 
search process has been further clouded by state-specific approaches to 
fix the problem.  This flood of nonuniform legislation may portend the 
doom of uniformity and commercial certainty under Revised Article 9 
unless a model uniform amendment is developed and adopted across all 
jurisdictions.  The practical problems faced by filers and searchers, along 
with the rise of state-specific legislation to address such problems, 
highlight the need for a model uniform amendment. 
To prompt discussion about and development of such an amendment, 
this Article advances a proposed framework that centers on the adoption 
of an exclusive source for determining sufficient debtor names for both 
individuals and registered organizations.  Such an approach is a workable 
solution that addresses the current commercial uncertainty facing 
interested parties in secured transactions and is supported by a number of 
other considerations.  In addition to providing definitive and 
unambiguous guidance regarding sufficient debtor names, the exclusive-
source approach improves the effectiveness of the notice-filing system 
by identifying a single debtor name for purposes of organizing recorded 
financing statements, simplifying the search parameters for those 
conducting searches of filing-office records, and ensuring reliable and 
consistent search results.  Finally, the exclusive-source approach is 
consistent with the idea that filers, not searchers, should bear the primary 
responsibility for giving notice of security interests.  Therefore, the 
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exclusive-source approach effectively advances the dual goals of 
increasing commercial certainty in secured transactions while supporting 
the original intent of Revised Article 9. 
